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ILLINOIS COAL MINE SUBSIDENCE LAW
Robert E. Beck*
Sharon Sigwerth**
In 1880, the Illinois Supreme Court established an absolute right
to subjacent support in the surface owner. This Article explores the
coal mine subsidence law that has since developed in Illinois. The
authors review the principles of liability established by the case
law and discuss the associated legal problems. They also examine
legislation dealing with coal mine subsidence, including Illinois and
federal laws.
Central and southern Illinois has been the site of much coal mining since
the mid-nineteenth century. I Consequently, Illinois property owners in
these areas are confronted with the serious problem of surface subsidence 2
from abandoned underground mines. 3 The resulting increase in property
damage has generated growing public concern . 4
* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law. B.S.L., LL. B., University
of Minnesota; LL. M., New York University. The authors wish to express their thanks to Pro-
fessor Beck's research assistant, Ronald W. Arbeiter, for his contributions to this article.
** B.A., J.D., Southern Illinois University. Member Illinois Bar.
1. HOUSE EXECUTIVE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MINE SUBSIDENCE, RESEARCH REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE RESEARCH REPORT]. See also note 3
infra.
2. Subsidence has been defined as "a downward movement of the ground surface caused
by solution and collapse of underlying soluble deposits, rearrangement of particles upon re-
moval of underground mineral deposits, or reduction of fluid pressures within an aquifer or
petroleum reservoir." C. SCHWARZ, E. THOR & G. ELSNER, WILDLAND PLANNING GLOSSARY
211 (1976) (emphasis added).
3. J. NAWROT, R. HAYNES, P. PURSELL, J. D'ANTUONO, R. SULLIVAN & W. KLIMSTRA,
ILLINOIS LANDS AFFECTED BY UNDERGROUND MINING FOR COAL 25, 35-37 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as ILLINOIS LANDS]. This study identified 4,076 abandoned underground coal mines in
Illinois and referenced 2,300 mining operations for which no site locations were available. An
illustrative problem of surface subsidence caused by abandoned mines was faced by the
Johnston City School District. The Johnston City Washington Elementary School was closed in
1972 after subsidence occurred. In 1974, after approximately one million dollars had been spent
on construction of a new school building on the site of the old school, the ground subsided
further and the construction had to be abandoned. See Board Sues Over School Damage,
SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, Dec. 21, 1976, at 3, col. 4.
4. Subsidence has caused severe damage to undermined areas of Belleville, Maryville, and
Zeigler, as well as many other communities throughout central and southern Illinois. See
HOUSE RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (1976); HOUSE EXECUTIVE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
MINE SUBSIDENCE, SUMMARY OF HEARINGS: BELLEVILLE, ILLINOIS, AUGUST 26, 1976, MAR-
ION, ILLINOIS, AUGUST 26, 1976 (1976). Recent news headlines continue to confirm this grow-
ing public concern. See, e.g., Mine Subsidence: "You Hear a Pop and Wonder What's Next,"
SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, June 24, 1979, at 1, col. 1; O'Fallon Subdivision, Mine Shaft Collapse,
SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, Aug. 28, 1978, at 12, col. 1; 300 Feet of Illinois 13 Prove It: Illinois Has
a Mine Sinkage Problem, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, Jan. 26, 1978, at 4, col. 1; Streator ... It's a
Town That's Slowly Sinking Away, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, Jan. 26, 1978, at 4, col. 5.
383
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Two factors apparently have been significant in creating the present prob-
lem. First, because of urban sprawl and general population growth, many
old mines that once were located in sparsely populated areas now underlie
portions of heavily-populated areas. 5 As the ground above these mines sub-
sides, the incidence of damage probably will increase. Second, timbers used
for underground support in many old mines have decayed and may have
become so weakened that they could give way at any time.6  Furthermore,
many of the old mines may have had insufficient initial support due to min-
ing practices such as "robbing" the coal of natural support pillars and failing
to replace the coal pillars with timbers.7
The potential exists for more subsidence in the future. Approximately
ninety-five percent of Illinois' coal, underlying sixty-five percent of the geog-
raphical area in the state, remains unmined. Because most of the coal
available for surface mining already has been removed, or is in the process
of being removed, future mining will concentrate on underground removal. 9
This Article examines the law concerning coal mine subsidence in Illinois.
The principles of liability established by case law and the associated legal
problems are reviewed and discussed. Attention is also addressed to the
legislation dealing with coal mine subsidence, including Illinois laws, the
subsidence aspects of the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 (Mining Control Act), 10 and the Illinois response to that Act.
ILLINOIS CASE LAW
In 1880, in Wilms v. Jess, 11 the Illinois Supreme Court handed down its
first decision on coal mine subsidence and stated that the owner of a mineral
estate in land could not remove minerals "without leaving support sufficient
to maintain the surface in its natural state." 12 Therefore, the lower court's
award of money damages for injuries to the plaintiff's house and well was
sustained. 13 The Wilms decision limited the rights of both the surface estate
5. For example, Springfield is located over a core of ground that is not undermined but is
surrounded by undermined areas into which Springield is expanding. HOUSE RE-
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-6 (1976).
6. id.
7. See Marquette Cement Mining Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co., 253 F. 107 (N.D. Il. 1918)
(injunction granted that restrained mining); Ciuferi v. Bullock Mining Co., 332 I1. App. 1, 73
N.E.2d 855 (4th Dist. 1947) (reversed verdict against coal mining company for property damage
due to subsidence); Hurst v. Sholl, 232 I1. App. 169 (2d Dist. 1924) (affirmed judgment for
damages due to subsidence from mining); Penn v. Taylor, 24 II. App. 292 (4th Dist. 1887)
(reversed and remanded judgment against coal mining company due to defective jury instruc-
tions).
8. HOUSE RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (1976).
9. See C. TREWORGY, L. BENGAL & A. DINGWELL, RESERVES AND RESOURCES OF
SURFACE-MINABLE COAL IN ILLINOIS (1978).
10. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1978).
11. 94 III. 464 (1880).
12. Id. at 467.
13. Id. at 469.
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owner and the mineral estate owner. 14 First, the court noted that the sur-
face owner and the mineral owner could regulate their respective rights by
agreement, thus suggesting that the surface owner could completely waive
the right to subjacent support. 15 The court, however, stated that the par-
ticular lease provision in Wilms that granted the defendants "'the right of
way and surface of so much of the tract as may be necessary for economical
use of the same' " 16 did not grant them the right to "destroy" the surface. 17
Additionally, the court stated that the particular lease provision in Wilins
that provided that "'no pillars shall be withdrawn within six hundred feet of
the [mine] shaft' "18 did not authorize the removal of all other pillars.19
Although clearly tempered by strict judicial interpretations, this right of
self-regulation has played a major role in the development of Illinois subsi-
dence law. 20
Second, the court noted that the surface-support entitlement only re-
quired that the surface be maintained "in its natural state," 21 and that,
therefore, subsidence caused by the weight of buildings constructed after
execution of the mining lease was "in the nature of contributive negli-
gence." 22  Such a defense, however, has not succeeded in any Illinois
14. The court found that while the severance of mineral rights from surface ownership ordi-
narily includes the means of obtaining or enjoying the mineral estate, such as the rights of
ingress and egress, the mineral estate's rights to use of the surface are not without limitation.
Id. at 468. See also Jilek v. C.W. & F. Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 250-51, 47 N.E.2d 96, 100-01
(1943), where the court affirmed a decree dismissing the suit in equity to quiet title to a mineral
estate.
15. The Wilms court found that the right of support prevailed where there is "no evidence
of title appearing to regulate or qualify their rights of enjoyment." 94 I11. at 467. The court
further stated that
where a land owner sells the surface, reserving to himself the minerals with power
to get them, he must, if he intends to have power to get them in a way which will
destroy the surface, frame the reservation in such a wa' as to show clcarly that he is
intended to have that power.
Id. at 468.
16. id. at 466-67.
17. i. at 467.
18. Id. at 467-68.
19. Id. at 467-69. The court relied upon one English case, Humphries v. Brogden, 116 Eng.
Rep. 1048 (Q.1B. 1850), that has been considered the leading English case and a primary source
of American subsidence law. In Humphries, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a
verdict because of the defendant's negligence in failing to leave sufficieut support in a mine. As
one commentator has noted:
Some American cases have followed Ilumphries v. Brogden's theory that the right
of subjacent support is a natural easement of support owed the dominant surface
estate by the servient mineral estate. Other American courts have considered the
right of subjacent support to be a right to the integrity of the surface estate.
Twitt', Late of Subjacent Support and the Right to Totally Destroy Sulface in Mining Opera-
tions, 6 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. INST. 497, 499 (1961).
20. See notes 96-134 and accompanying text infra.
21. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
22. 94 I11. at 469. The court stated:
The act of removing all support from the superincumbent soil is, prima facie, the
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case. 23 The surface owner in Illinois has been able to recover for damages
to buildings as an incident of the defendant's failure to support the surface in
its natural state regardless of when the buildings were erected. 24
The Wilms discussion of contributory negligence suggested that the min-
eral estate owner's duty to provide support for the surface owner might re-
quire only that he or she meet a standard of due care. The Illinois Supreme
Court, in Lloyd v. Catlin Coal Co., 25 however, stated that the right to sub-
jacent support "is absolute and without condition."26 This dictum has been
cited frequently in subsequent Illinois cases and apparently has laid to rest
further negligence arguments. 27
When the Wilms court suggested that construction of buildings sub-
sequent to the division in property ownership between the surface and the
mineral owners might constitute contributory negligence, 28 it said nothing
cause of its subsequently subsiding, but if the subsiding is, in fact, caused by the
weight of buildings erected subsequent to the execution of the lease of the mine,
this is in the nature of contributive negligence, and may be proved in defense. The
authorities do not require that plaintiff's proof shall exclude that hypothesis in the
first instance.
Id.
23. The contributory negligence defense has been raised in two cases since Wilms. See
Morris v. Saline County Coal Co., 211 111. App. 178 (4th Dist. 1918) (affirmed judgment against
mining company for failure sufficiently to support surface); Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v.
Novero, 135 I11. App. 633 (4th Dist. 1907) (affirmed award of damages for injury to surface
caused by underground mining operations).
24. A different rule prevails in several other jurisdictions. For example, a Colorado court
stated:
We find it to be a general rule of law that the owner of the surface rights who is
damaged by the removal of subjacent ... support is entitled to recover for any
damage to the structure on the surface if it is established by a preponderance of the
evidence that the damage was the result of lack of due exercise of care or skill or
negligence on the part of the ... subjacent owner.
Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Salardino, 125 Colo. 516, 522-23, 245 P.2d 461, 464-65 (1952).
25. 210 Ill. 460, 71 N.E. 335 (1904).
26. Id. at 468, 71 N.E. at 338. The court stated:
Appellant owns the surface, and, as a matter of law, is entitled to support from the
subjacent owner. This right of support is absolute and without condition, not de-
pendent upon the order of a court of chancery by injunction or upon the degree of
care that may be used by appellee in the prosecution of its work. If by the removal
of any of the coal or mineral under the land, though under the most approved
system of mining, complainant, as the owner of the superincumbent and superior
estate, is deprived of the necessary support for his land, then [at] that moment
liability to respond to damages rests on appellee.
Id.
27. 1d. See, e.g., Tankersley v. Peabody Coal Co., 31 11. 2d 496, 202 N.E. 498 (1964) (coal
mining company is not liable for subsidence of areas mined by predecessors); Ciuferi v. Bullock
Mining Co., 332 I11. App. 1, 73 N.E.2d 855 (4th Dist. 1947) (reversed verdicts for defendant
coal mining company); Hurst v. Sholl, 232 I11. App. 169 (2d Dist. 1924) (affirmed judgment of
damages for subsidence caused by failure to leave sufficient support in mine); Jent v. Old Ben
Coal Corp., 222 III. App. 380 (4th Dist. 1920) (affirmed judgment against coal mining company,
ruling that subjacent owner is liable for injuries).
28. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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expressly about buildings existing on the property before the division in
ownership. While an argument can be made that the court was implying that
such buildings automatically were entitled to support, such an argument
contradicts the "bundle-of-rights" approach to ownership, which views the
right to support of the soil as a natural, inherent part of the bundle of rights
that comes with ownership. 29 Because a building is not a natural part of the
landscape, it is conceptually difficult to place a building within the purview
of this theory. Instead, an express or implied grant or reservation of an
easement of support should be necessary to create the right to subjacent
support for a building. While no Illinois subsidence case has reached this
conclusion, 30 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District accepted
this line of reasoning in a case involving lateral support, 3 1 and that decision
was cited favorably by the same court in a subsidence case. 32
Although no case specifically states that Illinois follows the bundle-of-
rights theory, 33 the result of Corcoran v. Franklin County Coal Co. 34 is
explained best by this doctrine. The surface-ownership document in Corco-
ran contained a clause waiving liability for surface-subsidence damage. The
defendant argued that it did not have to establish itself as a party to or
29. Marquette Cement Mining Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co., 253 F. at 114.
30. The court in Wilins, however, specifically referred to maintaining the surface "in its
natural state." 94 I11. at 467. It has been stated that "structures existing or contemplated at the
time of the severance of the estates are entitled to support." 54 Am. JUR. 2d Mines & Minerals
§ 201 (1971). This statement can be explained by any one of three theories of recovery. The
building owner can recover: (1) because the ground would have subsided without the building
and loss to the building is a part of the incidental damage; (2) because of negligence on the part
of the coal operator; or (3) because there has been an implied grant or reservation of support for
the building under a traditional analysis. The third explanation is the most likely one for the
cited authority.
31. In Starr v. Standard-Tilton Milling Co., 183 Ill.App. 454 (4th Dist. 1913), the court
affirmed a judgment against the defendant/owner of a building erected next to the plaintiff's
building. The court stated that "if the grantor desired to make any reservation whatever it
should have been contained in his deed." Id. at 458. Although the court reached no conclusion
on whether the mere existence of the building at the time of a "grant" of the surface estate
would give rise to an implied grant of support for the building, the court indicated that it
might. Id. at 458-60.
32. Ciuferi v. Bullock Mining Co., 332 Ill. App. at 11-12, 73 N.E.2d at 860.
33. Specific references in the Illinois cases to a theory underlying the right to support pre-
sent a mixed bag. Thus, in Wilms v. Jess, 94 I11. at 467, the court referred to this theory as a
"right of enjoyment," and in Lloyd v. Catlin Coal Co., 210 I11. at 468, 71 N.E. at 338, the court
stated that it arose "as a matter of law." In Ames v. Ames, 160 I11. 599, 600, 43 N.E. 592, 593
(1896), however, the court referred to it as a "servitude." The leading case espousing the
easement or servitude approach is Humphries v. Brogden, 116 Eng. Rep. 1048 (Q.B. 1850). This
case has been cited with approval by several American cases. See, e.g., Wilms v. Jess, 94 I11. at
467. See also note I supra.
34. 249 111. App. 551 (4th Dist. 1928) (demurrer sustained in action to recover damages for
subsidence). In Marquette Cement, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
characterized the Illinois rule as one that assumes the bundle-of-rights approach, stating that
"the Illinois rule . . . is that the right of support is absolute, a substantive part of the mass of
rights constituting ownership of land. It is not an incident of ownership nor an easement." 253
F. at 114.
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intended beneficiary of the waiver clause because the waiver showed that
the surfhce owner never had received a right of subjacent support. 35 This
argument was consistent with the implied-grant or reservation-of-an-
easement approach to ownership. Under this approach there can be no im-
plied grant of subjacent support in an instrument that contains a clause
negating liability, as such a clause indicates the mineral estate owner's lack
of intent to grant the right initially. Because the plaintiff did not receive the
right of subjacent support in the ownership document, the defendant argued
that defendant could not be responsible for destroying such support. The
court, however, appearing to perceive the right to subjacent support as in-
hering as a part of the bundle of rights transferred with ownership, rejected
the defendant's argument. 36 A waiver of a specific right otherwise obtained
is granted for the benefit of those specific parties to whom the waiver is
directed. In order to be successful, then, the defendant would have had to
connect itself to the waiver clause.
What apparently has developed from the Wilms case is the surface owner's
inherent substantive right to subjacent support. How this right has fared
since the Illinois judiciary's early liberal interpretations of it will be dis-
cussed in the context of the specific issues that have been considered by the
courts.
Parties to a Suit
In Illinois subsidence cases, the identification of parties entitled to sue or
be sued and the circumstances under which suit may be brought are unset-
tled questions. The following considerations have concerned the Illinois
courts: (1) plaintiffs' and defendants' interests; (2) corporate structuring and
restructuring; (3) the statute of limitations; and (4) waiver.
1. Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Interests
Most suits involving subsidence fall into one of two categories: (1) those
brought by surfiace fee owners against coal companies who are both the own-
ers and the developers of the coal;3 7 and (2) those brought by surface owners
against coal developers who are lessees of the coal owners. .3 A number of
other suits, however, have questioned the standing or status of specific
categories of plaintiffs or defendants.
35. 249 II. App. at 552-53.
36. 1d. at 553.
37. See, e.g., Tankersley v. Peabody Coal Co., 31 Ill. 2d 496, 202 N.E.2d 498 (1964); Sav-
ant v. Superior Coal Co., 5 I1. App. 2d 109, 125 N.E.2d 148 (3d Dist. 1955) (affirmed judg-
ment for plaintiffs whose building subsided); Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Slata, 133 Ill.
App. 280 (4th Dist. 1907); Perry County Coal Mining Co. v. Maclin, 70 Il. App. 444 (4th Dist.
1897) (affirmed judgment for plaintiff suing tinder trespass for damages from undermining the
land).
38. See, e.g., Jent v. Old Ben Coal Corp., 222 Ill. App. 380 (4th Dist. 1920); Morris v.
Saline County Coal Co., 211 I1. App. 178 (4th Dist. 1918).
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The standing of a subsidence plaintiff has been sustained in a variety of
circumstances. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District found
standing where the plaintiff relied on deeds conveyed in 1905 and 1906 and
possessed the surface in 1920. The court held that this evidence constituted
prima facie title to the surface estate. 3 9  The same court rejected the
defendant's challenge to the plaintiff's standing where plaintiff, a contract
purchaser, was in possession of the surface. 40  Other plaintiffs whose rights
to sue have been upheld include a surface owner who had purchased his
title at a master's sale, 41 a trustee of the surface estate, 42 surface tenants who
were permitted to sue along with the surface fee owners, 4 3 and the owner of
an underground cement mine that was situated above the defendant's coal
mine. 44
Questions concerning the status of defendants have focused on whether
the coal owner can be sued when the owner has leased the coal for de-
velopment to another entity. According to the general rule, a lessor of min-
ing property is liable for lessee-caused surface subsidence only when: (1) the
lessor had control over the lessee's operations; (2) the lease expressly pro-
vided for operations that resulted in subsidence; (3) the lessor knew or
should have known at the time of execution of the lease that the operation
would cause subsidence; or (4) the lessor consented to or ratified negligent
operations, with actual knowledge of that negligence. 45 The only Illinois
case that specifically ruled on this question permitted the coal owner-lessor
to be sued.4 6  In Ciuferi v. Bullock Mining Co.,47 the Appellate Court for
the Fourth District ruled that the evidence indicated the coal owner had
exercised control over the mining operation. 48
39. Jent v. Old Ben Coal Corp., 222 111. App. at 383.
40. Morris v. Saline County Coal Co., 211 I11. App. at 184.
41. Pern v. Taylor, 24 Ill. App. at 294.
42. Seitz v. Coal Valley Mining Co., 149 111. App. 85 (2d Dist. 1909) (affirmed judgment for
trustee against coal mining company for damage to surface and building located upon surface).
43. Tankersley v. Peabody Coal Co., 31 11. 2d 496, 202 N.E.2d 498 (1964); Buis v. Peabody
Coal Co., 41 111. App. 2d 317, 190 N.E.2d 507 (3d Dist. 1963) (judgment against coal company,
however, was reversed due to miscalculation of damages).
44. Marquette Cement Mining Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co., 253 F. 107 (N.D. Ill. 1918). The
cement mine, although underground, was situated above the defendant's coal mine. The court
concluded that the owner of a higher stratum of the earth had the same rights as the owner of
the actual surface and allowed the cement mine owner to sue. The court stated that the word
'surface" was not restricted to the highest level of the earth, but instead included "that part of
the earth or geological section lying over the minerals in question." Id. at 111-12.
45. Butte Copper & Zinc Co. v. Poague, 164 F.2d 201, 203-04 (9th Cir. 1947) (judgment
against the coal company reversed due to the wording of the lease and status of the parties).
46. The question was raised but not resolved in Hurst v. Sholl, 232 II1. App. 169 (2d Dist.
1924). The Hurst court did not decide the matter because it found that the defendant's plea of
the "general issue" did not raise the question of the operation of the mine versus ownership of
the coal. Id. at 176.
47. 332 IlI. App. 1, 73 N.E.2d 855 (4th Dist. 1947).
48. Id. at 13-14, 73 N.E.2d at 861. The court found it significant that the owner had re-
served the right to appoint a competent inspector who was authorized to inspect all property
and all mining operations, had leased not only the coal but the mine shaft, buildings and
1980]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The same court made it clear that an owner cannot avoid the duty to
provide lateral support merely by hiring an independent contractor. In Starr
v. Standard-Tilton Mining Co.,49 the court stated that liability depends
upon whether the damage results from activity central to the agreement of
the parties or from activity "merely collateral" to the agreement. 5 Apply-
ing this approach to subjacent support issues implies that a coal owner's
ability to escape liability when leasing mineral rights for development would
be much narrower than that allowed by the general rule. In Ciuferi, the
court gave its approval to the earlier lateral support rule in Starr,51 but
found both the existence of a right to control and evidence of actual control.
The court therefore concluded that the lease in question was "an arrange-
ment for continuing the operation of a coal mine," rather than a mere lease
of the coal rights. 52 Starr and Ciuferi thus indicate that when an Illinois
coal owner has leased coal for development the scope of its liability for sur-
face subsidence will remain unknown until litigation compels a clear ruling.
Where specific challenges have been made to the status of particular
plaintiffs or defendants, the decisions have favored the plaintiffs and have
been consistent with the general approach taken in Wilrns. The net result of
plaintiff or defendant standing or status cases has therefore been the recogni-
tion of an important substantive right to support. If the Illinois courts adhere
to these decisions and adopt the Starr reasoning that holds owners who lease
coal for development responsible for the necessary consequences of that de-
velopment, they will maintain the Wibns approach. The final analysis, how-
ever, may require consideration of whether coal owners and-developers
should bear the burdens of that development, whether the burdens should
be borne by those who suffer subsidence damages, or whether the public at
large should assume the burdens. The moral dilemmas surrounding the allo-
cation of these burdens suggest that the issue should not be resolved
through consideration of legal doctrines.
machinery, and had required the lessee to remove at least 20,000 tons of coal per year and to
carry workmen's compensation. The court noted evidence that inspections had occurred, that
the owner had assisted the lessee in finding purchasers for coal and had reduced royalties
during periods of lessee difficulty, and that he had prepared the state-required operator's mine
map. Id. at 7-8, 73 N.E.2d at 858.
49. 183 III. App. 454 (4th Dist. 1913).
50. Id. at 461.
51. The Ciuferi court stated that "'[i]f the injury results directly from the acts called for or
rendered necessary by the contract and not acts which are merely collateral to the contract, the
employer is as liable as if he had himself performed such acts."' 332 III. App. at 12, 73 N.E.2d
at 860, quoting Starr v. Standard-Tilton Milling Co., 183 II. App. at 461. The Ciuferi court
further stated that allowing the owner of the mineral estate to avoid liability for surface support
while exercising coal rights through an "irresponsible lessee" would place an undue hardship on
the owners of the surface estate. 332 Il1 App. at 12, 73 N.E.2d at 860.
52. 332 II1. App. at 12, 73 N.E.2d at 860.
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2. Corporate Structuring and Restructuring
Corporate reorganizations and sales of corporate assets can confuse the
identification of parties who are liable for subsidence. An Illinois statute pro-
vides that in cases of consolidation or merger, successor corporations are
"liable for all the liabilities and obligations of each of the corporations so
merged or consolidated."'5 3 Thus, in a case where six corporations had been
merged into one new corporation and both a predecessor and the successor
corporation had mined some of the coal, the court held that the successor
was liable for all subsidence. 54 Few cases, however, have been that simple
to resolve.
In Buis v. Peabody Coal Co.,55 the defendant purchased coal that re-
mained in the ground after the seller had discontinued its underground min-
ing operations. Because the relationship between the parties was that of an
arm's-length buyer and seller, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third Dis-
trict concluded that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff only for subsi-
dence caused by its own mining. The court noted that the defendant's liabil-
ity for seller-caused subsidence can only result from an express or implied
assumption of such liability. In finding the defendant liable only for its own
activity, the Buis court observed that holding the purchaser of the assets of
an extinct coal company liable for subsidence occurring years later could
result in a flood of litigation. 56
The Buis approach was adopted a year later by the Illinois Supreme Court
in Tankersley v. Peabody Coal Co. 57 Although the Tankersley court stated
that its ruling would cause no loss to the surface owner, 5 the court ignored
the concerns of surface owners who are left without a remedy for damages
caused by defunct mining companies. The court reasoned that because sur-
face owners are on notice of the existence of an underground mine and of
the severed underlying mineral interest, they take these matters into ac-
count when negotiating the purchase price for the surface. 59
The Tankersley decision has placed unnecessary burdens on both the
buyers and sellers of surface rights. The surface owner supposedly has an
"absolute" right to surface support. Yet, under Tankersley, the possible pur-
chaser must calculate the extent to which the potential subsidence that may
result from a severed mineral interest or underground mine will affect the
value of the surface. Additionally, when the mineral interest is severed and
sold, the owner, in setting the price for the mineral interest, must either
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.69(e) (1977).
54. Wanless v. Peabody Coal Co., 294 Ill. App. 401, 13 N.E.2d 996 (3d Dist. 1938).
55. 41 111. App. 2d 317, 190 N.E.2d 507 (3d Dist. 1963).
56. Id. at 323, 190 N.E.2d at 510. In Buis, Peabody purchased the coal in 1916, but the
subsidence did not begin until 1949.
57. 31 111. 2d 496, 202 N.E.2d 498 (1964). The court stated that either an express assump-
tion of liabilities or a sufficient relationship between two business entities would be necessary to
justif, imposing the liabilities of the predecessor mining operation on its successor.
58. Id. at 502-03, 202 N.E.2d at 502.
59. Id. at 502-03, 202 N.E.2d at 501-02.
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consider future calculations to be made by subsequent purchasers or suffer
the loss in surface value attributable to potential subsidence when a sub-
sequent purchaser refuses to pay the full price for the surface.
Another problem arising from Tankersley involves the situation in which
the first purchase of the surface estate occurs with no indication that mining
will take place in the foreseeable future, but mining has begun by the time
the next sale of the surface estate occurs. Because the possibility of subsi-
dence will increase with the onset of mining, the original purchaser might
suffer an irremediable loss upon his or her subsequent sale. The possibility
of subsidence, the probability of subsidence, and the actual occurrence of
subsidence are distinct concepts and cannot be assigned the same value. A
slight reduction in price based on the assumption that improper mining will
occur and possibly result in subsidence does not compensate adequately for
the actual loss that occurs when the surface in fact subsides.
These problems arose partly because the Tankersley court's reliance on
the Pennsylvania case, Noonan v. Pardee,6 0 was misplaced. The Tankersley
court quoted with approval the Noonan court's observation that "it is not
improbable that this risk [of subsidence] enters largely into the commercial
value of all like surface land in that region." 6 1 The Noonan court addition-
ally stated, however, that "each grantee has the right to presume that the
subjacent owner has performed his legal duty; and the price, while probably
somewhat depreciated by the possible risk, is not fixed on a presumption
that his land will subside because of any special failure" by the person who
has mined the coal. 62 This additional language substantially impairs the im-
pact of the Noonan language quoted by the Tankersley court. Additionally,
the Noonan court had to consider the Pennsylvania statute of limitations that
required suits to be brought within six years from the time of coal re-
moval. .6 Because all the parties involved with coal mining in Pennsylvania
know that there can be no recourse against any miner after six years, surface
owners might well attempt to include the post six-year subsidence risk in the
purchase price. Further, a Pennsylvania surface owner can choose to rely on
the right of access to the mine to ensure that the duty to preserve the
surface is being performed, rather than relying on price adjustment. 64 In
contrast, Illinois suits based on subsidence need not be brought within six
years of the mining because the Illinois statute of limitations does not begin
60. 200 Pa. 474, 50 A. 255 (1901).
61. 31 111. 2d at 503, 202 N.E.2d at 502, quoting Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. at 484, 50 A. at
257.
62. 200 Pa. at 486, 50 A. at 257.
63. Id. at 483-84, 50 A. at 256-57.
64. This right of access is enforceable in the courts if the mine operator denies access to the
surface owner. Id. at 484, 50 A. at 257. See also cases cited in note 85 infra. There is no
indication in any, Illinois case of a similar right on the part of the surface owner to take action to
protect the surface. See Tankersley v. Peabody Coal Co., 31 111. 2d 496, 202 N.E.2d 498 (1964);
Buis v. Peabody Coal Co., 41 111. App. 2d 317, 190 N.E.2d 507 (3d Dist. 1963).
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to run until the subsidence occurs and there is no alternative right of ac-
cess. 65  Forced pricing of the risk would therefore be inappropriate in Il-
linois.
The Tankersley court assumed that the purchaser of a surface estate takes
with notice of both the underlying severed mineral interest and the exis-
tence of underground mines. 66 This assumption may be correct with re-
spect to the mineral interest because knowledge of such is based on either
actual notice or the familiar recording statutes. 67 Because Illinois has an un-
derground coal mine mapping statute, the court also assumed that the public
records provide additional notice of the mine underneath the surface. 68 If
the mapping system functioned properly, those mines operating after the law
took effect in 1911 would indeed be indexed as part of the title record of the
property affected, 6 9 although mines closed prior to 1911 would not be re-
corded. A review of title records, however, indicates that the system has not
worked. 70
65. See Wanless v. Peabody Coal Co., 294 Ill. App. at 407, 13 N.E.2d at 999; Treece v.
Southern Gem Coal Corp., 245 I11. App. 113, 118 (4th Dist. 1923).
66. 31 Ill. 2d at 503, 202 N.E.2d at 502.
67. Id.
68. In holding that the coal mine operator was not liable for surface subsidence, the Illinois
Supreme Court in Tankersley stated:
The rule enunciated today works no hardship on the owners of the surface lands
overlying mine excavations. When such owners purchase they are clearly on notice
of the separate underlying mineral interest, as a result of a prior title examination or
from the fact that our statutes require that a copy of maps of all coal mines in the
county, whether 'operating' (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 93, pa. 33.01 et seq.), or
'abandoned' (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 93, par. 34.01 et seq.) be filed and kept in
the office of the county recorder. Moreover, the statutes require that maps of new,
proposed, or reopened mines be promptly indexed by the county recorder as part
of the title record of the property affected. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 93, par.
33.09). Thus, the fact that there are or may be underlying mine excavations is a
practical ingredient in the purchase price of such properties.
Id.
69. A mapping requirement for underground mines first was enacted in 1872, but that law
merely gave the mine inspector the authority to require a map. Act of March 27, 1872, § 1,
1871-72 I11. Laws 568. In 1879, the map requirement was made mandatory, but it only had to
be filed with the inspector and kept at the appropriate regional office. Act of May 28, 1879, § 1,
1879 I11. Laws 204-05. An act in 1899 finally required that a copy of the map be turned over to
the county recorder. Act of April 18, 1899, § 1(g), 1899 II1. Laws 300, 302. Then, in 1911 the
legislative assembly required the county recorder to index the map as a part of the title record
of the property affected. Act of June 6, 1911, § 7(g), 1911 111. Laws 388, 98.
70. A recent inquiry at the county recorder's office in three southern Illinois coal mining
counties disclosed that such maps have not been indexed as a part of the title records in any of
the three counties. Apparently the recorders in these counties were not aware that a law re-
quired such indexing. In one county where an index is kept to the maps themselves, the index
is kept by name of the mine, so that a searcher must know the name of the mine he or she is
interested in before the relevant map can be located. In another county the recorder and his
staff did not know where the maps were kept and outside assistance was necessary to identify
their location. In two of the counties, the maps were simply placed loose in a drawer. In the
third county the maps were on microfilm and, consequently, indexed. Report of Ronald W.
Arbeiter to Professor Robert E. Beck Concerning Visits to Franklin, Jackson, and Williamson
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The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District considered the prob-
lems created by corporate dissolution and by the parent-subsidiary relation-
ship in Edwards v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway.71 The action was
brought by a surface owner against a parent corporation, the mining sub-
sidiary, and the subsidiary's five directors. 72 The court upheld dismissal of
the suit as to the subsidiary and its directors, but reversed the dismissal as
to the parent corporation. 7 The court's decision with respect to the sub-
sidiary and its directors was based on an Illinois statute that requires any
action against a dissolved corporation or its directors to be "commenced
within two years after the date of such dissolution. "74  The plaintiff in Ed-
wards failed to meet this requirement. 75 This statute also provides that any
action brought after dissolution must relate to "any right or claim existing, or
any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution." 76 Under this statute,
therefore, no liability can accrue to the dissolved corporation or its directors
where no subsidence has occurred prior to dissolution.
In concluding that the parent in Edwards was subject to suit, the appel-
late court noted that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient oil two
points: first, there was a "unity of interest and ownership"'77 between the
parent and subsidiary; and second, recognition of their separate identities
would "'present an obstacle to the due protection or enforcement of public
or private rights."' 78 This decision and Illinois decisions unrelated to coal
mining 79 imply that a mere unity of interest and ownership between two
corporations is insufficient to make a parent company liable for the acts of its
County Register of Deeds (Nov. 1978). These findings were confirmed on a larger scale by the
data from the recent Illinois Institute of Environmental Quality Study that discovered refer-
ences to 2,300 underground mines for which no site locations could be discovered. See ILLINOIS
LANDS, supra note 3.
71. 79 I11. App. 2d 48, 223 N.E.2d 163 (4th Dist. 1967).
72. The parent corporation, Chicago and Northwestern, owned all of the stock of a sub-
sidiary, Superior Coal Co., except for the shares the directors of the corporation had to hold in
order to qualify as directors. The subsidiary dissolved and the parent received all of its assets.
The plaintiff sued Superior, its five directors, and Chicago and Northwestern. Id. at 50-51, 223
N.E.2d at 164.
73. Id. at 55, 223 N.E.2d at 166.
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.94 (1957). The statute remains unchanged today.
75. In Edwards, the suit was commenced eight months -after the two years had expired. 79
Ill. App. 2d at 51, 223 N.E.2d at 164.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.94 (1957).
77. 79 II. App. 2d at 52-53, 223 N.E.2d at 165.
78. Id. at 53, 223 N.E.2d at 165, quoting Ohio Tank Car Co. v. Keith Ry. Equip. Co., 148
F.2d 4, 6 (7th Cir. 1945).
79. See Dregne v. Five Cent Cab Co., 381 II1. 594, 46 N.E.2d 386 (1943) (court refused to
hold parent cab company liable for injuries to a passenger in a cab owned by its subsidiary
company when the subsidiary was not fraudulently organized); Kruse v. Streamwood Utils.
Corp., 34 II1. App. 2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731 (Ist Dist. 1962) (court failed to find that a conspi-
racy to take advantage of the plaintiffs existed between the parent utility company and its sub-
sidiary and, therefore, refused to hold the parent company liable for the subsidiary's actions).
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subsidiary. 80 In the Edwards case, the parent received the subsidiary's as-
sets upon dissolution, and, according to the plaintiffs' allegations, fraudu-
lently performed certain acts and made certain statements that caused the
plaintiffs to delay their suits against the subsidiary until the two years had
elapsed. 81
These few Illinois cases dealing with corporate structuring in the coal min-
ing context result in a substantial burden being placed on persons suffering
damage from coal mine subsidence. As the court so appropriately observed
in the Buis case: "Mining companies have flourished and died. No assets
remain and there is nothing remaining except the old coal passageways
under the ground." 8 2 These decisions have aggravated the situation by sub-
stantially insulating successors-in-interest from responsibility for their pre-
decessors' conduct. The courts have concluded that such insulation would
further mining absent any real evidence suggesting that contrary decisions
would substantially impair mining. The Illinois courts have reasoned that
purchasers of the surface estate consider the possibility of subsidence when
they determine the surface purchase price. By analogy, the courts could
have stated that if the mineral estate purchaser will be held responsible for
the subsidence caused by the seller's mining, the purchaser will take that
responsibility into account when setting the coal's price. This approach
would place some responsibility for subsidence on the previous miner, as
that miner would have received less for its coal. The problem, unfortunately,
is only partially alleviated by the Illinois statute providing for continued re-
sponsibility following corporate merger and consolidation.
3. The Statute of Limitations
The Illinois statute of limitations provides that actions to recover damages
for injury to real property must be commenced within five years of the ac-
crual of the cause of action. 83 Several Illinois courts have considered the
problem of calculating the precise time of accrual for a cause of action arising
out of mining activities. In Treece v. Southern Gem Coal Corp., 84 the Ap-
pellate Court for the Fourth District reasoned that the cause of action could
accrue at one of two times: either when the support was removed from the
surface, as the Pennsylvania cases held, 8 5 or when the subsidence occurred,
80. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Dregne, stated that the parent corporation will be liable
for its subsidiary's acts only if "there is such unity of interest and ownership that the individual-
ity of the one corporation and the owner or owners of its stock has ceased, and further, that the
observance of the fiction of separate existence would under the circumstances sanction a fraud
or promote injustice." 381 I11. at 604, 46 N.E.2d at 391.
81. 79 I11. App. 2d at 51, 223 N.E.2d at 164.
82. 41 111. App. 2d at 323, 190 N.E.2d at 510.
83. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1977).
84. 245 I11. App. 113 (4th Dist. 1923).
85. See Woods v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 230 Pa. 197, 79 A. 499 (1911); Tischler v. Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co., 218 Pa. 82, 66 A. 988 (1907); Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, 50 A. 255 (1901).
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as the English, 8 6 Alabama,8 7 Kansas, 88 and New Jersey 89 cases held. The
Treece court found the second line of authority persuasive 90 because it more
adequately protected the plaintiff's interests. 91
Two Illinois decisions that reaffirmed Treece's time-of-occurrence approach
to accrual also discussed the consequences of amending a deficient com-
plaint. 92 The courts relied on the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 93 which pro-
vides that the amendment shall relate back to the date of the original com-
plaint for limitation purposes if the subject matter of the amendment "grew
out of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading."
94
In both cases, the courts found that the subject matter of the amendment
grew out of the same transaction or occurence as that described in the orig-
inal pleading.95 Thus, the Illinois statute of limitations cases are consistent
with the general approach taken in Wilms: the right to subjacent support is
an important substantive right entitled to serious protection in the courts.
4. Waiver
Where the surface of land belongs to one individual and the underlying
minerals to another, the owner of the minerals is liable when he or she
86. See Darley Maine Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, 11 App. Cas. 127 (1886); Backhouse v.
Bonomi, 9 H.L.C. 503, 11 Eng. Rep. 825 (1861).
87. See West Pratt Coal Co. v. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 849 (1909).
88. See Audo v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 99 Kan. 454, 162 P. 344 (1917); Walsh v.
Kansas Fuel Co., 91 Kan. 310, 137 P. 941 (1914).
89. See Church of the Holy Communion v. Paterson Extension R.R., 66 N.J.L. 218, 49 A.
1030 (1901).
90. 245 11. App. at 118-19.
91. Id. See also note 185 infra. The defendant in Treece argued that the cause of action
arose at the time of the removal of the support and, therefore, it could not be assigned to the
plaintiff either separately or as part of the transfer of the surface ownership because it was a
personal cause of action. The court found it unnecessary to discuss the nature of the action until
the subsidence occurred, and at that time the plaintiff owned the surface. 245 11. App. at 119.
Thus, the cause of action accrued directly to him and no question of its transfer arose.
Although the question of transferability has yet to be resolved in the subsidence context, the
general rule in Illinois on assignability of choses in action states that "a chose in action of such
nature that it would survive and pass to the personal representative of its owner on his death
call be effectively assigned." 3 I.L.P. Assignments § 12 (1953). That authority further states that
"a cause of action arising from torts to property, real or personal, is assignable." Id. § 15.
92. Savant v. Superior Coal Co., 5 Ill. App. 2d at 114, 125 N.E.2d at 151; Wanless v.
Peabody Coal Co., 294 11. App. at 407, 13 N.E.2d at 999.
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 46(2) (1977).
94. Id.
95. Savant v. Superior Coal Co., 5 II. App. 2d 109, 125 N.E.2d 148 (3d Dist. 1955)
(amended complaint, alleging that five years before it was filed defendant caused subsidence of
plaintiff's land by removing coal without leaving sufficient support, grew out of the same oc-
currence set up in the original complaint alleging that two years before filing suit defendant's
same actions caused subsidence of plaintiff's land); Wanless v. Peabody Coal Co., 294 11. App.
401, 13 N.E.2d 966 (3d Dist. 1938) (amended complaint, stating that six corporations consoli-
dated under the name of Peabody Coal Co. and the original Peabody Coal Co. caused subsi-
dence damage by improper removal of coal, grew out of same occurrence set up in original
complaint directing same allegation solely toward the original Peabody Coal Co.).
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removes them without leaving sufficient support to maintain the surface in
its natural state. 96 The surface owner can waive the right to support, how-
ever, with "express words of waiver or by necessary implication from the
language used" 97 in the deeds. After initially adopting a plaintiff-sympathetic
posture, Illinois courts subsequently moved toward a broad construction of
waiver clauses-a position they maintain presently.
Early Illinois courts vigorously scrutinized purported waiver clauses; clear,
specific language was required in order to raise a presumption that the sur-
face owner had given up the right of support. 98 Clauses permitting the
removal of "all coal and minerals," 99 "including the ribs and pillars,"'
10 0
were held insufficient to waive the right to subjacent support. 101 Such lan-
guage was not considered sufficiently precise to indicate that the parties had
contemplated either subsidence damage to the surface10 2 or a waiver of lia-
bility if such damage did occur. 103 A clause extending the right to mine
coal while doing "as little damage to the surface" of the land as was conve-
nient104 also was held insufficient to relieve the mineral owner of liability for
subsidence damage. 105 Although this language implied that surface damage
would certainly result from the mining, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Second District stated that the language implied a waiver of liability only for
damages resulting from legitimate surface activities. 106 These clauses,
96. Wilms v. Jess, 94 I11. at 467.
97. Seitz v. Coal Valley Mining Co., 149 Il. App. 85, 87-88 (2d Dist. 1909).
98. Id. See Marquette Cement Mining Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co., 253 F. at 111; Wilms v.
Jess, 94 III. at 468-69.
99. Wilms v. Jess, 94 I11. at 466.
100. Seitz v. Coal Valley Mining Co., 149 I11. App. at 85. The grantee had the "right to
extract . . . all the said coal . . . including the ribs and pillars .... Id.
101. Wilms v. Jess, 94 Il1. at 468-69; Seitz v. Coal Valley Mining Co., 149 I11. App. at 93.
102. The surface owner may expect the mineral owner to install artificial supports if the right
to remove all of the coal was exercised.
103. Because neither clause mentions liability, there is no clear implication from the language
used that liability was waived. The Wilms court stated that the grantee "must, if he intends to
have power to get [the coal] in a way which will destroy the surface, frame the reservation in
such a way as to show clearly that he is intended to have that power." 94 I11. at 468.
104. Seitz v. Coal Valley Mining Co., 149 Ill. App. at 86.
105. Id. at 93.
106. Id. at 93. In reaching this conclusion, the Seitz court relied on Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa.
485, 14 A. 379 (1888). The deed in Williams provided that "in mining and removing the coals,
iron ore and minerals aforesaid, [defendant] shall do as little damage to the surface as possible."
Id. at 495-96, 14 A. at 382. The Williams court refused to recognize this language as an effective
waiver and stated:
[A]n absolute right to surface support is not to be taken away by a mere implication
from language which does not necessarily import such a result. The owner of the
coal had certain surface rights which were indispensable to the carrying on of his
mining operations, such as the right to go upon the surface to make explorations for
the minerals beneath, and bore holes, sink shafts, drifts, etc., and the right to make
roads, and erect structures for taking out the coal. Hence it is a fair construction of
the deed to say that, in doing these things, as little damage was to be done to the
surface as possible. The provision referred to covers these matters; and, as we have
a subject to which it directly applies, it would be a strained interpretation of the
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therefore, did not give rise to the necessary implication that the right of
support had been waived by the surface owner. Only a waiver clause
explicitly stating that the mineral owner had the right to mine coal without
risking liability for any resulting surface subsidence was held to be an effec-
tive liability-insulator. 107
Strict construction of waiver clauses ended, however, in Boyer v. Old
Bewn Coal Corp. 108 The Boyer court held that the surface owner had ex-
pressly waived 10 9 the right of support with a clause giving the mineral
owner the right to mine coal "without liability for any damage to the sur-
face" occurring either at the time of coal removal or any time thereafter. 110
Prior Illinois decisions had limited this type of language to damage resulting
solely from surface activities because of its failure to refer specifically to lia-
bility for subsidence damage. 111 Arguably, then, the Boyer court errone-
ously departed from precedent in stating that the clause contained an ex-
press waiver of liability for surface subsidence damage. The Boyer court in-
correctly relied on a Pennsylvania case 112 in which the court referred to
similar language1 13 as being "express and distinct." 114 In that case, how-
deed to hold that it was intended to take away the right of surface support.
Id. at 496, 14 A. at 382-83.
107. See Wesley v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 221 Ill. App. 427 (4th Dist.
1920). The court sustained the defendant's contention that it was exculpated by a waiver clause.
Although the opinion does not contain the specific language of the clause, it appears from the
court's discussion that the language waived liability for any subsidence damage resulting from
the defendant's operations in language similar to that found in two other Illinois cases where the
language of the clauses were not at issue. The deed in Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin
Coal Co., extended the right to mine "without any liability for surface subsidence caused by
mining out of the coal or other minerals and from not leaving pillars or artificial supports under
said land." 382 I11. at 243, 47 N.E.2d at 97. Morris v. Saline County Coal Co. involved a lease
that stated the grantee had the "right and privilege to excavate, mine, take out and remove all
of the coal from or on said premises without any liability for surface subsidence occasioned
thereby." 211 111. App. at 181.
108. 229 111. App. 56 (4th Dist. 1923).
109. Id. at 58.
110. Id. at 57-58.
111. Marquette Cement Mining Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co., 253 F. at 111; Wilms v. Jess, 94
Ill. at 468-69; Seitz v. Coal Valley Mining Co., 149 I11. App. at 87-88.
112. Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15 (1880).
113: In Scranton, there was a conveyance of coal with the right to mine and remove the
same without "any liability for any injury that may result to the surface of the said premises
from the mining and removal of the said coal." 94 Pa. at 18-19. The Boyer court also cited the
following seven cases where the waiver clauses containing similar language insulated the mineral
owner from liability for surface subsidence: Paull v. Island Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 218, 88
N.E.959 (1909); Charnetski v. Miners Mill Coal Mining Co., 270 Pa. 459, 113 A. 683 (1921);
Weakland v. Cymbria Coal Co., 262 Pa. 403, 105 A. 558 (1918); Stilley v. Pittsburgh-Buffalo
Coal Co., 234 Pa. 492, 83 A. 478 (1912); Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 217 Pa. 449, 66 A.
7643 (1907); Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 212 Pa. 63, 64, 61 A. 559, 560 (1905); Godfrey
v. Weyanoke Coal & Coke Co., 82 W. Va. 665, 97 S.E. 186 (1918). In the Miles case, however,
there was specific reference in the clause to "falling in" of the "surface," making that clause
clearly different from the others.
114. Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. at 22.
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ever, because the mineral owner was precluded by the sale contract from
using any portion of the surface in its mining operations, 115 the clause could
have been applied only to subsidence damage resulting from subsurface ac-
tivities. Thus, the Pennsylvania court viewed the waiver clause as express
only because of its particular factual context, not because of its particular
language.
The Boyer court should have relied on the Pennsylvania opinion at most
to argue that the waiver in Boyer arose by necessary implication from the
language employed. The deed in Boyer contained a separate paragraph relat-
ing to the right to use the surface. A special provision therein dealt with
liability for any surface activities. 116 Thus, it could have been argued in
Boyer, as in the Pennsylvania case, that by necessary implication the waiver
language in question only related to surface damages resulting from subsur-
face activities because there was no surface activity to which it could attach.
Furthermore, the waiver clause in Boyer also contained language that
exempted the mineral owner from liability for damage occurring at any time
after removal of the coal. 117 Because subsidence is the most likely type of
future damage, this also could necessarily imply that liability for subsidence
damage had been waived.
Unfortunately, the Boyer court ignored this analysis and concluded that
the language constituted an express waiver of support. Consequently,
whenever language similar to that found in Boyer has been at issue, Illinois
courts have concluded that there was an effective waiver without carefully
analyzing the waiver clause or the surrounding facts. 11 Clauses exempting
the mineral owner from liability "for any damage done to the surface of [the]
land,"119 or "waiving, releasing and surrendering any and all claims for
damages and all liability by reason of damages ...to ...[the] property" 120
115. Id. at 18.
116. 229 I11. App. at 58-59.
117. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
118. See Mason v. Peabody Coal Co., 320 I11. App. 350, 51 N.E.2d 285 (3d Dist. 1943); Cope
v. United States Fuel Co., 229 111. App. 243 (3d Dist. 1923). See also Corcoran v. Franklin
County Coal Co., 249 Ill. App. at 552.
119. Cope v. United States Fuel Co., 229 I11. App. at 244 (emphasis added). The waiver
clause in Cope stated that "[tlhe grantors hereby expressly covenant that the grantee has the
right to mine and remove all of said vein of coal and that he shall not be liable for any damage
done to the surface of land in so doing." Id.
120. Mason v. Peabody Coal Co., 320 I11. App. at 352, 51 N.E.2d at 286 (emphasis added).
The surface owner granted the mineral owner the right
to enter beneath the surface of said premises, and mine, dig and remove the coal
and other minerals therefrom ... hereby . .. forever waiving, releasing and sur-
rendering any and all claims for damages and all liability by reason of damages
either to persons or property which may in any way be caused or occasioned at any
time hereafter, directly or indirectly, by the mining or removing of coal or other
minerals from said premises, or by the enjoyment of any of the rights and privileges
hereby granted . . ..
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have been held to be effective waivers. 121 Under strict construction, how-
ever, both clauses could be construed as limited to damage resulting from
surface activity. Thus, despite the strict construction approach of the early
Illinois cases requiring clauses specifically waiving liability for subsidence
damage, a waiver clause currently is more likely to be effective if the scope
of its language is general. 122
Waiver clauses have been attacked as void on two grounds: (1) because
they lack any separate consideration; and (2) because they are contrary to
public policy. 123 The lack-of-consideration argument has never been fully
discussed and was dismissed in an appellate decision simply because the
surface owner had accepted a deed containing the waiver language. 124 At
the very least, the appellate court should have inquired whether the sum
paid for the coal was commensurate with the full value of the entire tract.
The public policy argument also was rejected under the theory that indi-
viduals enjoy the right of freedom to contract and, therefore, it is not against
public policy to hold them to an agreement they made with each other. 125
121. Id. at 354, 51 N.E.2d at 287; Cope v. United States Fuel Co., 229 111. App. at 253.
122. Consider the Mason court's following analysis of a waiver clause:
By the language of the deed in question the damages waived and released are 'any'
and 'all' claims for damage and 'all' liability by reason of damage either to 'persons
or property' in 'any' way caused at 'any" time 'directly or indirectly' by the mining
or removing of coal from plaintiff's premises or by the enjoyment of 'any' of the
rights and privileges granted by the deed. Such language is plain and unambiguous.
It is comprehensive and all-inclusive in its reference to possible claims for damages.
Instead of specifying particular damages and injuries, it purports to give a general
release of 'all' claims, and the general character of the language used is not in any
way qualified or restricted by any other language, In our opinion, the [subsidence]
damages set forth in the plaintiff's complaint are clearly damages to property caused
either directly or indirectly by the mining and removal of coal under plaintiff's
premises.
320 II1. App. at 353, 51 N.E.2d at 287 (emphasis added). See also Corcoran v. Franklin County
Coal Co., 249 I11. App. at 552. The court stated that a clause that reserved to the defendant the
right to mine coal under a certain lot but stated that the defendant was not "responsible for any
damages that may occur while removing said coal or after the same has been removed" was
"broad enough" to exculpate the defendant from liability for damages from surface subsidence.
123. Wesley v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 221 I11. App. at 432.
124. Id. at 433-34.
125. Id. The Wesley court relied on decisions from three other jurisdictions for its conclusion
that a waiver clause is not against public policy. Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15 (1880), was the
first case cited that developed this argument. In Scranton, the court stated:
[I]t was agreed, the owner of the mine, his heirs and assigns, should be exempt
from . . . liability [for subsidence damage]. . . .We see no reason why a person
shall not be bound by his agreement to exempt another from liability for damages in
working a coal mine. . . .No rule or policy of law forbids it. The undoubted inten-
tion of the parties to the contract was that [the defendant] might mine and remove
the coal without any obligation to support the surface or liability in case it fell [in].
Id. at 22. The Scranton public policy argument was adopted in two other cases cited in Wesley:
Paull v. Island Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. at 224, 88 N.E. at 961 (the contract is the law between
the parties when its language is clear and unambiguous); Godfrey v. Weyanoke Coal & Coke
Co., 82 W. Va. at 668, 97 S.E. at 188 (no case denies parties the right to contract provisions
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An unsettled question is whether, or to what extent, an otherwise effec-
tive waiver clause will exculpate a mineral owner from liability for subsi-
dence damage that results from negligent coal mining. One district of the
Illinois Appellate Court has decided that a mineral owner cannot be liable
on a negligence theory for subsidence that results from removing all of the
coal where the deed specifically gave the right to mine and remove all of the
underlying coal and the waiver clause released the miner from all liability for
surface damage. 126 The court stated that the mineral owner cannot be
guilty of negligence in this situation because he or she is only recovering his
or her property. 127  The court failed to consider, however, whether total
coal removal would have been possible without causing subsidence. The
court would have been wiser to consult the rationale of other jurisdictions
that have held that when it is economically and technologically feasible to
remove the coal without causing subsidence, failure to do so constitutes neg-
ligence. 128 On the other hand, if the coal cannot be removed without caus-
ing subsidence, then the exculpatory clause will allow liability-free removal.
Still undecided in Illinois is whether a waiver clause that releases the
mineral owner from liability for surface damage without simultaneously giv-
ing the express right to mine all the coal will exonerate the owner from
liability for subsidence resulting from negligent removal of all the coal. This
is an area where the Illinois courts could apply a strict construction of waiver
clauses in order to benefit the surface owner, and thereby return to some
extent to the approach of the earlier Illinois cases. 129  Although court deci-
sions generally have favored the coal developer to the exclusion of the sur-
diminishing the legal liability of the grantee so long as the exonerating provision is clearly
expressed).
126. Cope v. United States Fuel Co., 229 Il. App. 243 (3d Dist. 1923). The waiver clause in
Cope stated that the grantee had "the right to mine and remove all of said vein of coal and that
he shall not be liable for any damage done to the surface of land in so doing." Id. at 244. The
plaintiffs charged that the grantee had "negligently, wilfully, wrongfully and improperly mined
and removed" all of the coal under their land and thereby negligently and wrongfully failed to
guard the plaintiffs' land against subsidence. Id. at 245. The court failed to find the grantee
guilty of a negligent act. Id. at 253.
127. Id. at 253.
128. See, e.g., Livingston v. Moingona Coal Co., 49 Iowa 369 (1878). Livingston involved a
deed that gave the defendant the "right to mine, and obtain and remove the [coal], by such
means as they deem proper, without thereby incurring, in any event whatever, any liability for
injury caused for damage done to the surface of the land in working [the] coal .... " Id. at
370. The court held that the defendant was bound to exercise ordinary care when mining, and if
such care required that pillars of coal or artificial supports be left in order to protect the surface
owner's property, then their removal would constitute negligence and the mineral owner would
be liable for any resulting damage. Id. at 371-72. See also Western Ind. Coal Co. v. Brown, 36
Ind. App. 44, 74 N.E. 1027 (1905). The deed gave the defendant the "right to mine the coal
from under said real estate without any liability for damages to said surface." id. at 48, 74
N.E.2d at 1029. The Brown court stated that even though there was an "express stipulation that
there should be no liability, the same would not relieve the [defendant] from the liability for
injury caused by [his] own negligence." Id. at 50, 74 N.E. at 1029.
129. One area of the law where courts have had an opportunity to consider waiving liability
for negligence is that of bailment. A recent summary concluded:
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face owner and have interpreted waiver clauses presumptively to the de-
veloper's advantage, even those decisions would concur with the earlier
cases that refused to enforce a waiver clause against a surface owner who was
not a party to the clause. 130
In considering the more recent pro-waiver posture of the Illinois courts, it
should be noted that the most recent case was decided in 1943,131 that all of
the decisions are from the appellate courts, 132 that the matter never has
been considered by the Illinois Supreme Court except in Wilms, which was
an opinion typifying the strict construction approach, 133 and that the public
policy arguments were decided in the early 1920's before public concern for
subsidence had manifested itself. 134 Perhaps the time has come for the
Illinois Supreme Court to undertake a close review of the waiver clauses.
Even if the court is not willing to consider the public policy arguments
against waiver clauses, it should at least closely scrutinize the negligence
[W]hile the right of an ordinary bailee to contract to exempt himself from liability for
his own negligence or that of his employees is generally recognized, there is a
strong tendency, particularly in the recent decisions, to hold stipulations of this
kind void as violating public policy, in contracts for hire entered into by bailees in
the course of general dealings with the public.
8 AM. Juts. 2d Bailments § 128 (1963). The rule regarding the ordinary bailee "is applied with
practical unanimity where the public neither has nor could have any interest whatsoever in the
subject matter of the contract .... " Id. § 130. However, even this rule "does not apply when
it will operate to relieve a party from liability arising out of his own fraud or want of good faith,
or, according to some authorities, from the consequences of his gross negligence." Id. It is not
necessary to look further than the recent headlines and the recent legislation to see a dem-
onstration of public interest in subsidence problems. It exists in the concern for expending
public funds to repair or replace roads and public buildings that have been damaged due to
subsidence, in the concern for the large amount of unusable land, and in the concern for the
general economic loss that occurs when a substantial amount of private property is damaged.
See note 4 supra.
130. In Morris v. Saline County Coal Co., 211 Ill. App. 178 (4th Dist. 1918), the court held
that the waiver clause was inapplicable because it was given to the coal developer by the coal
owner after he had conveyed the surface ownership to the plaintiff. The coal developer argued
that his lease actually was executed before the coal owner conveyed the surface to the plaintiff.
The court replied that the developer could not rely on that lease since it had not been recorded
and there was no evidence that the plaintiff had any notice of it. id. at 184. The surface owner,
therefore, was entitled to surface support form the coal developer regardless of the provisions of
his lease with the coal owner. Id. at 184-85.
In Jent v. Old Ben Coal Corp., 222 I11. App. 380 (4th Dist. 1920), the court found a waiver
clause to be unavailable for the same reason as in Morris. The appellant in Jent removed the
coal under appellee's land pursuant to a lease executed by a third party. The lease also exemp-
ted the appellant from liability for any damage caused by subsidence. Id. at 384. The court
refused to recognize this waiver clause because it was executed long after the appellee had
acquired title to the surface. The deeds to the appellee did not contain any provision that
exempted a person mining coal from liability for damages caused by subsidence. Id.
131. Mason v. Peabody Coal Co., 320 111. App. 350, 352 N.E.2d 285 (3d Dist. 1943). See
notes 118-122 and accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 108-130 and accompanying text supra.
133. See notes 98-103 supra.
134. Public concern for subsidence is a recent phenomenon. See note 4 supra.
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argument and should return the courts to the strict construction espoused by
the early cases. This return should be for one basic reason, if for no other,
and that reason concerns the matter of notice to the surface purchaser.
When a deed clause reads "without any liability for surface subsidence oc-
casioned thereby" it should be clear to any surface purchaser what is in-
tended. Anything less, however, presents ambiguity as to whether subsi-
dence damage was even contemplated by the parties. In the area of waiver
clause interpretation, the Illinois courts have deviated the most from the
Wilms general approach of recognizing the right to subjacent support as an
important substantive right entitled to protection in the courts.
Remedies
Although there is considerable authority relating to damages awards in
subsidence cases, there is very little authority relating to injunctions enjoin-
ing the removal of subjacent support. It appears, however, that in some
cases the complainant would have either a choice of the two remedies, or
would be able to get both damages for past subsidence and injunctive relief
to protect against future subsidence.
1. Damages
The Illinois courts have held that plaintiffs can allege and prove damages
only for past subsidence, not for future subsidence. 135 Two justifications
have been given for this result. First, according to legal theory in Illinois,
the cause of action does not accrue until the subsidence occurs. 136 Second,
as a general rule, future damages are not awarded unless the injury is cer-
tain, permanent, and necessarily continues to produce a loss.137 Because "the
taking out of coal without leaving a sufficient support may or may not cause
injuries thereto in the future .. .the damages should be confined to such as
have occurred before suit is brought."'x3 8 Thus, plaintiffs are left with the
right to sue for actual damages "from time to time as the damages are sus-
135. Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 109 Ill. App. 122, 125-26 (3d Dist. 1903). The reversible error
occurred when the trial court instructed the jury to allow damages for "such subsidence of the
surface of the land as had occurred at the time this suit was commenced, and which would
occur thereafter." 109 111. App. at 125. The court stated that "[for the damages occasioned from
subsidence of such parts of the land as had taken place at the time this suit was commenced,
the appellee could in his action, recover, but not for such as might thereafter occur." Id.
See also Richards v. Gundlach, 245 II1. App. 264, 266 (4th Dist. 1924), where the court found
that "it was error to admit evidence of injuries sustained after the filing of said suit," but
affirmed the judgment against the coal company for surface subsidence. But see Grese v. Donk
Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 147 I11. App. 284, 285 (4th Dist. 1909) (the jury was allowed to con-
sider testimony regarding future subsidence because the parties stipulated that the plaintiff
should recover both future and past damages).
136. See notes 83-95 and accompanying text supra.




tained. "139 In a successive suit, the plaintiff can recover "such damages as
he has sustained prior to its commencement, not barred by a previous re-
coveiy. "140 In addition, tenants from year to year are limited to recovering
the damages that occur to crops in the year when the subsidence takes
place. 141 Thus, if a tenant renews the lease with knowledge of a past subsi-
dence and the subsidence area later fills up with water and ruins the new
crops, he or she cannot recover. 142
The amount of damages awarded depends upon the nature of the injury. If
the injury is to land, the measure of damages is the difference between the
market value of the land before and after the subsidence. 143 Relying upon
this measure of damages, the court in Penn v. Taylor 144 held that it was
error to instruct the jury that no damages resulted if the plaintiff could rent
his land after subsidence for as much as he had rented it before the subsi-
dence and that he could sell it for as much money as he had paid for it.
Reimbursement for money expended is not a sufficient measure of loss. 145
A different damages formula is used when the injury is to buildings and
other improvements on the surface. In such cases, "the cost of repair or of
restoring the premises to their original condition is the true and better rule
to apply." 146  This formula has been justified on the basis that, without it,
plaintiffs could not recover for minor damages such as broken windows. 14 7
The rule also has been justified on the basis that the market value of prop-
erty depends on the condition of the buildings, and the cost of restoring
them to their original state is the best evidence of their pre-injury condi-
tion. 1 48  Perhaps the courts are trying to formulate damages measurement
139. Morriss v. Saline County Coal Co., 211 Ill. App. at 186-87 (affirmed judgment against
coal company for damages to surface estate).
140. Id.
141. Tankersley v. Peabody Coal Co., 31 111. 2d at 506, 202 N.E.2d at 503-04.
142. Id.
143. Richards v. Gundlach, 245 I11. App. 264 (4th Dist. 1924). In this case, the court rejected
the cost of restoring the premises to the condition they, were in before the injury occurred as
the measure of damages. Id. at 267. The court then adopted the market value rule and, in
explanation, stated that the cases involving the cost of repair rule dealt with claims of damage to
buildings and that damage formulas "'should be adopted which will be most beneficial to the
injured party, as he is entitled to the benefit of the premises intact." Id. at 267. The court,
however, afirmed the judgment against the coal company despite evidence admitted regarding
the price to fill in cracks on the surface and to restore the land. Id. at 269.
144. 24 Ill. App. 292, 293 (4th Dist. 1887) (reversed and remanded for judgment for the coal
company).
145. Id.
146. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Slata, 133 I11. App. 280-83 (4th Dist. 1907). See also
Richards v. Gundlach, 245 Ill. App. at 267; Hurst v. Sholl, 232 Ill. App. at 181-82.
147. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Slata, 133 Ill. App. at 283. This formula was followed in two
prior cases where the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed judgments against tunnel contractors
whose use of dynamite caused damage to buildings on the surface. See Chicago v. Murdoch,
212 Ill. 9, 72 N.E. 46 (1904); FitzSimons Connell Co. v. Braun & Fitts, 199 I11. 390, 65 N.E.
249 (1902).
148. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Novero, 135 I11. App. at 636 (affirmed judgment against
coal company for damages to surface estate and to improvements thereon).
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rules that are the "most beneficial to the injured party." 149
Several Illinois court opinions have been concerned with evidentiary prob-
lems relating to the proof of damages. Appeals challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence to satisf, a preponderance of the evidence test have resulted in
sustained verdicts, 150 remittiturs, 151 and reversals. 152 Other cases con-
cerned with evidentiary problems have dealt with the role of the jury in the
determination of damages. Where the jury has been allowed to view the
premises involved, the court has held that such a viewing was only for the
purpose of understanding the facts of the case and not for the purpose of
exercising judgment as to damages. 153 Also, where the jurors have been
instructed that they could use their own knowledge and experience as to the
amount of damages, the appellate court has held that an error has been
committed. 154 Despite cases in which appeals have failed because of
evidentiary problems and reversals have resulted due to consideration of fu-
ture damages, the awarding of damages in subsidence cases is consistent
with the general Illinois approach of recognizing the right to subjacent sup-
port as an important substantive right that is entitled to substantial protec-
tion in the courts.
2. Injunctive Relief
Only two Illinois subsidence cases have considered the question of injunc-
tive relief. The Illinois Supreme Court was the first court to consider this
question in 1904 in Lloyd v. Catlin Coal Co. 155 To prevent further subsi-
dence to his property, the plaintiff in Lloyd sought injunctions either to
enjoin the defendant from any mining, or to direct the manner in which the
defendant removed the coal. 156 The supreme court denied the suit for in-
junctive relief because the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law to re-
cover for each instance of damage, 15 7 and because the damage was not ir-
149. Id. The Donk court stated that "[t]he valuation should be adopted which will be most
beneficial to the injured party, for he is entitled to the benefit of the premises intact and to the
value of any part separated." Id. See also Hurst v. Sholl, 232 Ill. App. at 183; Donk Bros. Coal
& Coke Co. v. Slata, 133 I11. App. at 284.
150. Marchetti v. Lumaghi Coal Co., 13 I11. App. 2d 526, 142 N.E.2d 815 (4th Dist. 1957);
Savant v. Superior Coal Co., 5 Ill. App. 2d 109, 124 N.E.2d 148 (3d Dist. 1955); Ciuferi v.
Bullock Mining Co., 332 Ill. App. 1, 73 N.E.2d 855 (4th Dist. 1947); Treece v. Southern Gem
Coal Corp., 245 II1. App. 113 (4th Dist. 1923); Livergood v. Stonington Coal Co., 201 111. App.
114 (3d Dist. 1915); Perry County Coal Mining Co. v. Maclin, 70 I11. App. 444 (4th Dist. 1897).
In Isaacs v. Superior Coal Co., 20 I11. App. 2d 599, 156 N.E.2d 769 (3d Dist. 1959), a verdict
for the defendant was sustained on the evidence.
151. Richards v. Gundlach, 245 I11. App. 264 (4th Dist. 1924); Seitz v. Coal Valley Mining
Co., 149 Ill. App. 85 (2d Dist. 1909).
152. Buis v. Peabody Coal Co., 41 111. App. 2d 317, 190 N.E.2d 507 (3d Dist. 1963).
153. Jent v. Old Ben Coal Corp., 222 I11. App. 380 (4th Dist. 1920).
154. Wanless v. Peabody Coal Co., 294 Ill. App. 401, 13 N.E.2d 996 (3d Dist. 1938).
155. 210 I11. 460, 71 N.E. 335 (1904).
156. Id. at 462, 71 N.E. at 336.
157. Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 109 II1. App. 122, 125 (3d Dist. 1902) ($6000 award was
reversed and remanded because it was based in part on the prospect of future subsidence).
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reparable 15 inasmuch as the plaintiff could be compensated adequately in
assessable damages. 159 However, although the court did mention the
defendant's financial capability to respond in damages, 160 it failed to con-
sider whether the defendant would be around to respond in damages fifteen
or twenty years later when subsidence might occur as a result of present
mining practices. The court also noted that because there was no certainty as
to further subsidence, 161 granting an injunction would cause more harm to
the defendant than benefit to the plaintiff.
The court seemed most concerned with identifying the conduct that would
have to be enjoined. 1 62  Practical considerations suggest that the court's
issuance of such an injunction would require it to choose among mining prac-
tices and, perhaps even to supervise the mining activity.163 The court dis-
tinguished those cases in which injunctions had been issued where the
defendants had no right to mine at all 164 and where the plaintiffs indicated
specific wrongful acts, such as robbing pillars. 165 Neither type of case in-
volved the supervision problem posed in Lloyd.
While injunctive relief was found to be inappropriate on the facts in
Lloyd, the court did set forth three conditions that must be satisfied before
such relief will be granted: (1) inadequacy of the remedy at law; (2) likeli-
hood of future subsidence; and (3) practicality of supervision of the or-
der. 166 Because the Illinois courts consistently have viewed the prospect of
future subsidence as uncertain, 167 the necessity of satisfying the "likelihood"
158. The court stated:
"[A]n injury is irreparable either from its own nature, as when the party injured
cannot be adequately compensated therefor in damages, or when the damages
which may result therefrom cannot be measured by any' certain pecuniary standard,
or when it is shown the party who must respond is insolvent, and for that reason
incapable of responding in damages.-
210 I11. at 464, 71 N.E. at 337, quoting 16 Am.i. & ENG. ENCYCLO. OF LAw 361 (2d ed.
1896).
159. The Lloyd court stated that "[t]he uses ... are not exceptional or unusual, but like that
of ordinary firm lands, . . .it could hardly be .. .that a slight subsidence of the soil of a farm
could not be compensated." 210 Ill. at 465, 71 N.E.at 337. The court, however, further stated
that "[i]n a city where the use of the land is mainly for the support of buildings ... [sub-
sidence] would doubtless work such irreparable injury
, 
as would be staid by injunction." Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 470, 71 N.E. at 339.
162. Id. at 469, 71 N.E. at 338-39.
163. 1d. at 470, 71 N.E. at 339. The court concluded:
What amount of coal must be left is a question of fact which must be ever difficult
of determination, and can be best dealt with by those acquainted with the science
of mining, as the work progresses. It is largely a question of engineering, and courts
will encounter great difliculty in assuming, and will only in rare cases, where the
remedy at law is so inadequate as to render such course necessary, assume, charge
of the operation of such work and direct the manner ini which it shall be done.
Id.
164. Id. at 468-69, 71 N.E. at 338.
165. id. at 469, 71 N.E. at 338. The court's example was Thomas Iron Co. v. Allentown
Mining Co., 28 N.J. Eq. 77 (1877).
166. 210 II1. at 465-67, 71 N.E. at 337-38.
167. See notes 135-38 and accompanying text supra.
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element as a pre-condition might well render injunctive relief an unrealistic
alternative in subsidence cases.
The question of injunctive relief in an Illinois subsidence case was consid-
ered again by a federal district court in 1918 in Marquette Cement Mining
Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co. 168 The court in Marquette, however, not only
found that subsidence had occurred, but also that further subsidence would
occur. 169 The other conditions from Lloyd had been met as well. 170 The
remedy at law was inadequate due to the irreparable harm the plaintiff
would suffer. 171 Unlike Lloyd, the plaintiff's use of the land in Marquette
was unique because it was operating a cement mine in an underground
stratum above the defendant's operation. This type of operation made it dif-
ficult to assess damages and to assure the plaintiff adequate compensa-
tion. 172 The court also found that a balancing of interests favored the plain-
tiff even though it meant closing the defendant's coal mine for many
years. 173 Because the conditions set forth in Lloyd were met the court
granted the injunction.
Although the Marquette decree was framed so that the defendant was en-
joined from mining "in such a manner as to cause or allow any part of the
... property . . . to subside by reason of the withdrawal of the coal"1 7 4 and
from extracting coal "without leaving and providing adequate support which
will at all times prevent the soil and property . . . from subsiding, and also
from impairing the natural support which said coal furnishes to the said land
175 the practical effect of such an injunction might be to stop the
mining since there is no sure way of leaving "adequate" support other than
by not mining. Cessation of mining, therefore, would eliminate the supervi-
168. 253 F. 107 (N.D. II1. 1918).
169. Id. at 116. The court found "that the continuance of coal' mining will vitally injure
territory in which the mine practice is good and sufficient." Id.
170. Id. at 117-120.
171. Id. at 119. The court stated that any injunction "should not be granted except in a clear
case .... But when it is clear that subsidence will seriously impair the mining use, the injury is
irreparable, and should be restrained." Id.
172. Id. at 117. The court analogized to an oil case, Texas Co. v. Central Fuel Oil Co., 194
F. 1 (8th Cir. 1912), and stated:
Equity jurisdiction was sustained, because plaintiff could not recover all the dam-
ages it might sustain, and because they were impossible of proof, the amount of oil
which the defendant could produce being uncertain. So in this present case no one
can tell what damage the cement company may sustain by future subsidence. Fu-
ture actions at law would be necessary as the injury progressed. Recurring suits for
damages would be more vexatious and expensive than effective.
253 F. at 117.
173. 253 F. at 120. According to the Marquette Cement court, "[w]hen each party is pursuing
his own rights and collision results, the one without legal culpability of any kind must prevail, if
the other occupies legally indefensible ground." Id. The court seemed to desire to balance the
conduct of the parties rather than the extent of harm or benefit from granting or denying the
injunction, although the facts would appear to favor plaintiff on the latter balancing as well. Id.
at 119.




sion problem for the court, but may result in an undue burden on the
defendant.
Probably the best answer is a compromise between the Illinois Supreme
Court's approach and that of the federal district court. Thus, the court
neither would reject supervision as in Lloyd nor give the type of blanket
order resulting in closure as in Marquette. Rather, the court would listen to
testimony regarding specific steps that might feasibly be taken to protect the
surface against subsidence and then decree that those steps be taken. This
would give substantial protection to the plaintiff without placing an undue
burden on the defendant. While judicial involvement in technological mat-
ters through the issuance of injunctive relief may have been novel and dis-
couraged in the pre-1920 period, it is now a commonplace occurrence. 176
Proof of Subsidence
A plaintiff frequently encounters problems of proof even when a cause of
action exists and there is a viable defendant. The plaintiff must prove: (1)
that the support for the surface has been withdrawn; (2) that the defendant is
responsible for the withdrawal of support; (3) that there has been surface
subsidence as a result of the withdrawal; and (4) that plaintiff has been dam-
aged by the subsidence. 177 The Wilms court, which first articulated the
concept of a prima facie subsidence case, stated that "[t]he act of removing
all support from the superincumbent soil is, prima facie the cause of its
subsequently subsiding .... " 178  This concept has been applied in several
later Illinois cases. 179
For example, in Savant v. Superior Coal Co., 180 the court found that the
coal had been removed from beneath the premises in question over twenty
years before the subsidence occurred. The plaintiff offered proof of subsi-
dence and of the extensive damage to his house, lot, and adjacent property.
The Savant court considered this proof sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of subsidence resulting from the removal of coal. ll The defendant
attempted to rebut the plaintiff's case by offering evidence that the subsi-
dence involved was "not typical of a coal mining subsidence," 18 2 and that
the damage to the house may have been caused by the settling of the chim-
176. See Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
817 (1977); Oakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 498 (1977).
177. Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ill. at 466-67.
178. Id. at 469.
179. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Watts, 17 F.2d 981, 982 (7th Cir. 1927); Tankersley v.
Peabody Coal Co., 31 111. 2d at 505, 202 N.E.2d at 503; Marchetti v. Lumaghi Coal Co., 13 I11.
App. 2d at 528, 142 N.E.2d at 816; Savant v. Superior Coal Co., 5 I!. App, 2d at 119, 125
N.E.2d at 153.
180. 5 Ill. App. 2d 109, 125 N.E.2d 148 (3d Dist. 1955).
181. Id. at 119, 125 N.E.2d at 153.
182. Id. at 119-20, 125 N.E.2d at 153.
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ney. 183 Although this conflicting evidence raised a question for the jury,'1 4
the verdict in favor of the plaintiff was sustained. 185
The Wilms rule received an expansive application from the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Standard Oil Co. v. Watts. 186 In Watts, the plain-
tiff introduced a mining map as evidence that the defendant had mined be-
neath the plaintiff's surface. 187 The court concluded that this map was satis-
factory evidence of the defendant's mining activities. 118 The court then
considered the extent to which the plaintiff could rely upon the map to show
that subsidence had occurred as a result of the defendant's mining. Although
the court recognized that plaintiffs in earlier Illinois cases had presented
some other evidence of causation in addition to the mere fact that the coal
had been removed, 189 it decided that it is not unreasonable to conclude that
surface subsidence that follows the removal of subjacent coal has been
caused by such removal' 90 where no other evidence of any other cause of
subsidence has been presented. The court pointed out that because it was
183. Id. at 120, 125 N.E.2d at 153.
184. Defendant offered no evidence as to damage to the sewer or as to subsidence of the
back yard. Id.
185. Id. For another jury case where the verdict in favor of the plaintiff was sustained, see
Marchetti v. Lumaghi Coal Co., 13 Ill. App. 2d 526, 142 N.E.2d 815 (4th Dist. 1957). The
Marchetti court reasoned as follows:
In the action before us there was evidence that the land owned by plaintiff was
improved .... After July 1, 1954 a large crack appeared in the ground, entering
plaintiff's land one corner, running through the buildings and emerging on the far
side of the buildings, continuing to the far side of plaintiff's property where it abuts
the township road. At the same time damage to foundations, floors, walls, and to
plumbing was noted in the improvements on the land.
There was also evidence that similar cracks have appeared in other subsidence
cases and that where water has been introduced on fire clay at the bottom of a coal
mine with sinking of the stratum, cracks on the surface causing damage to buildings
resting on the surface can result. There was evidence that while defendant had not
removed coal from under the premises in question for many years, defendant had,
over a period of years prior to the damage, introduced large quantities of water
(about 200 gallons of water per minute for fourteen hours a day, for two hundred
days a year) into the mining shaft of defendant less than a thousand feet from plain-
tiff's premises.
While there was substantial contradictory evidence, under the facts, it would
have been error for the Trial Court to direct a verdict and its refusal to direct such
verdict was proper.
Id. at 528-29, 142 N.E.2d at 816-17. See also Wanless v. Peabody Coal Co., 294 I11. App. at
414-15, 13 N.E.2d at 1002, regarding evidence as to "when" a subsidence ocurred. In Wanless,
the court reversed and remanded a judgment for plaintiff due to improper instructions on fixing
damages.
186. 17 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1927). Standard Oil has been cited with approval in Tankersley v.
Peabody Coal Co., 31 111. 2d at 505, 202 N.E.2d at 503, and Marchetti v. Lumaghi Coal Co., 13
I11. App. 2d at 528, 142 N.E.2d at 816.
187. 17 F.2d at 981. State law requires coal developers to prepare and file maps. See notes
68-70 and accompanying text supra.
188. 17 F.2d at 982.
189. Id.
190. Id. The court stated that this is the conclusion required by "the law of gravity." Id.
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the defendant's mine, the defendant can most appropriately testify as to the
causal relation between the mining and the subsidence. 191
Establishment of a prima facie case based merely on the defendant's re-
moval of coal, therefore, will be sufficient to recover damages if the defen-
dant offers no rebuttal evidence. If such rebuttal evidence is offered, how-
ever, a jury question results that could place a burden on the plaintiff to
produce additional evidence. In either situation, a proof standard is estab-
lished recognizing the plaintiff's enforceable right to subjacent support.
ILLINOIS LEGISLATION
Since 1975, the Illinois General Assembly has approved six acts that could
relate to surface subsidence caused by underground coal mines. These acts
deal specifically with abandoned mines, 192 insurance, 193 research, 194 and fu-
ture mining activities. 195 Two of the acts 196 focus on compliance with re-
quirements of the federal Surface Mining and Control Reclamation Act of
1977.197
Abandoned Mines
The first Illinois legislation that can be interpreted as dealing with subsi-
dence problems was the 1975 Abandoned Mined Lands Reclamation
Act. 198 It established an Abandoned Mined Lands Reclamation Council, 199
charged principally with the mission to acquire, reclaim, and dispose
of abandoned mined lands. 20 0 The 1979 Abandoned Mined Lands and
Waters Reclamation Act, 201 effective June 1, 1980, repealed the 1975
Act. 202 Despite repeal and the fact that the 1979 Act contains many new
provisions, the Abandoned Mined Lands Reclamation Council created by the
191. Id.
192. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, §§ 3404-3405 (1977); Abandoned Mined Lands Reclamation
Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § 4601-4615 (1977); The Abandoned Mined Lands and
Waters Reclamation Act, P.A. 81-1020, 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. 2663 (West).
193. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.401-.414 (Supp. 1978), as amended by P.A. 81-1178
(Nov. 29, 1979).
194. Act of Sept. 15, 1978, P.A. 80-1436, 1978 Ill. Laws 1659.
195. The Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act, P.A. 81-1015, 1979
I11. Legis. Serv. 2625 (West).
196. Id. See also The Abandoned Mined Lands and Waters Reclamation Act, P.A. 81-1020,
1979 I11. Legis. Serv. 2663 (West).
197. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 1 1977).
198. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, §§ 4601-4615 (1977).
199. Id. § 4604. The Council is "comprised of: (a) Director of Mines and Minerals, (b) Direc-
tor of Conservation, (c) Director of Agriculture, (d) Director of Business and Economic De-
velopment, (e) Director of Local Government Affairs, (f) Director for the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, and (g) Director of the Illinois Institute of Environmental Quality, or their desig-
nates." The Chairman of the Council is the Lieutenant Governor, or his designate. Id.
200. Id. § 4605.
201. P.A. 81-1020, 1979 II. Legis. Serv. 2663 (West).
202. Id. § 3.07-08.
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1975 Act remains essentially the same, 203 and the six priorities for action
established through Council rulemaking pursuant to the 1975 Act 20 4 are in-
corporated into the new law. 205 Consequently, some of the experiences
encountered under the old law will be relevant under the new law, and the
importance of the 1975 Act is of more than historical interest.
While the principal focus of the acts appears to be on the reclamation of
surface mined land, the language in both acts also applies to surface effects
of underground mining. For example, the 1975 Act's definitions of "aban-
doned lands" and "mined land" specifically refer to "land affected by...
underground mining."-20 6  Because subsidence is an "effect" of underground
mining, this language leads to an argument that the Act impliedly confers
authority to deal with subsidence. The definition of land affected by under-
ground mining, however, does not mention subsidence; rather, it focuses on
refuse, haul roads, drainage ditches, equipment storage areas, and process-
ing areas. 20 7 This gives substance to an argument that while the Illinois
General Assembly intended to grant authority to deal with some surface ef-
fects of underground mining, it did not intend to deal with subsidence.
Furthermore, under the 1975 Act the only abandoned land that qualified for
remedial action by the Council was land that was affected before January 1,
1962, and that was "neither being mined nor applied to any other commer-
cial purpose or for which taxes are in default" as of the effective date of the
Act, July 1, 1975. 208 The January 1, 1962, cut-off date makes some sense in
the context of surface mining inasmuch as that was the effective date of
Illinois' first surface mining reclamation act. 209 The date makes no sense,
however, in the context of the surface effects of underground mining and
thus further emphasizes that the real impact of the 1975 Act was intended to
be upon abandoned surface mines rather than abandoned underground
mines.
203. The 1979 Act adds the Executive Director of the Capital Development Board to the list
of members established by the 1975 Act. Id. § 1.04. The Director of the defunct Illinois Insti-
tute for Environmental Quality is replaced by the Director of its successor, the Illinois Institute
of Natural Resources. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, §§ 7401-7404 (Supp. 1978).
204. 2 Ill. Reg. 179, 183-90 (No. 34 1978). See text accompanying notes 231-240 infra.
205. P.A. 81-1020, § 2.03(a), 1979 111. Legis. Serv. 2665 (West).
206. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § § 4603(a) and (e) (1977).
207. Land affected by underground coal mining is defined as:
land on which shafts, tunnels, or adits have been excavated for the mining of coal,
any land on which refuse from underground mining is deposited, haulage road,
drainage ditches, equipment storage areas, and all land or property of the proces-
sing plant and all areas adjacent thereto and affected by the processing that contri-
bute directly or indirectly to the mining or handling of coal.
Id. § 4603(i).
208. Id. § 4603(a).
209. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 93, §§ 180.1-.13 (1963) (repealed 1971). The 1943 Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 93, §§ 162-180 (1943), was declared unconstitutional in Northern Ill. Coal Corp. v.
Medill, 397 11. 98, 72 N.E.2d 844 (1947), and was repealed by Act of July 1, 1949, 1949 Il1.
Laws 1588.
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In contrast, the 1979 Act applies to
any land and water which were mined for coal or which were af-
fected by such mining, wastebanks, coal processing, or other coal
mining processes, and abandoned or left in an inadequate reclama-
tion status prior to August 3, 1977, and for which there is no con-
tinuing reclamation responsibility under State or Federal laws. 210
The cut-off date for action by the Council tnder the 1979 Act is August 3,
1977, which is the effective date of the federal Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977. 211 Because the subsidence provisions of the fed-
eral act relating to future mining were not fully operative as of August 3, this
is not the most desirable date for purposes of determining the Council's
authority for dealing with potential subsidence problems, 212 but it is a con-
siderable improvement over the cut-off date in the 1975 Act. While the 1979
Act does not refer specifically to subsidence, neither does it focus solely on
surface impacts of underground mining that are unrelated to subsidence, as
was the case under the 1975 Act. 213 Still, there are difficulties in interpret-
ing the scope of the 1979 Act. For example, the Act focuses on reclaiming
abandoned land. It is therefore difficult to categorize repair to a $75,000
home that has subsided as a reclamation of abandoned land within the scope
of the 1979 Act, despite the fact that abandoned land also includes land "left
in an inadequate reclamation status," 214 and reclamation is defined to in-
clude "restoration of... land . . . to constructive uses, including . . . resi-
dential . . . sites, and abatement, control or prevention of adverse effects of
coal mining. "215 Though close reading of this language suggests authority to
fill sinks and cracks in the surface, to repair access, to fill mine voids, and
perhaps even to shore up individual houses to prevent further damage, it
does not suggest the authority to repair damage to an individual house.
Thus, the conclusion remains that the principal surface effects of under-
210. P.A. 81-1020, § 1.03(a)(1), 1979 111. Legis. Serv. 2663 (West).
211. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. I 1977).
212. Because August 3, 1977, is the date used in Title IV of the federal Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 as the cut-off date for determining eligibility of lands for
reclamation with federal funding, 30 U.S.C. § 1234 (Supp. 1 1977), the state really did not have
much choice. See text accompanying notes 243-45 infra.
213. The Act gives the Council specific authority to provide "by rule for the filling of voids
and sealing of tunnels, shafts and entryways, and reclamation of the surface impacts of under-
ground or surface mines." P.A. 81-1020, § 2.02(b), 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. 2664 (West). One of
the phrases used throughout the Act to describe the scope of activity of the council is "restore,
reclaim, abate, control, or prevent" adverse effects of past coal mining practices. Id. §§
2.04(a)(2), 2.04(a)(4), 2.04(b), .09(a), .10, 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. at 2665, 2667-68. In addition,
"reclamation" is defined as "the restoration of abandoned lands and waters to constructive uses,
including, but not limited to forests, grasses and legumes, row crops, wildlife and aquative
reserves and recreational, residential and industrial sites, and abatement, control or prevention
of adverse effects of coal mining." Id. § 1.03(a)(7), 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. at 2663.
214. Id. § 1.03(a)(1), 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. at 2663.
215. Id. § 1.03(a)(7), 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. at 2663.
1980] MINE SUBSIDENCE
ground mining contemplated by the 1979 Act are those associated with re-
fuse disposal.
In addition to the definitional problems under the 1975 Act, the entire
scheme of that Act militates against interpreting it to deal with subsidence
problems. The Act requires the state to "acquire" title to any land that the
Council intends to reclaim 216 and, upon completion of the project, to retain
the title, transfer it to some other public entity, or sell it. 217 This acquisi-
tion aspect of the 1975 Act is not consistent with the development of a mine
subsidence reclamation project in an area where, for example, private homes
have been damaged by subsidence. It is impractical for the Council to "ac-
quire" the homes and then repair and resell them. 21 Therefore, it cannot
be argued that the General Assembly contemplated such an acquisition and
resale program for private homes. Nor is it likely that owners of homes that
have been "affected" by mining would be in default on their property taxes,
which is the only way non-commercial land is eligible for reclamation. 219
Thus, both the definitions and the scheme of the 1975 Act appear to con-
template dealing with unused areas of surface lands. While it is possible that
open tracts of surface land exist where sinks and cracks have developed due
to subsidence and could be acquired and reclaimed, it is unlikely that such
tracts would meet the cut-off date, lack of commercial use, or tax default
tests of the 1975 Act. 220
On the other hand, the 1979 Act expressly equips the Council with au-
thority to reclaim privately owned land 2 21 and to make such land bear the
216. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, §§ 4605, 4610 (1977). A question arises as to whether the
state needs to acquire the full fee simple title or whether some lesser interest such as a life
estate or leasehold would be sufficient. Although it might be argued that the Illinois Attorney
General ruled the full fee title is required in Op. I11. Atty. Gen. (April 7, 1978), this ruling is
more properly interpreted as only stating that a leasehold from a local government unit is not
sufficient under the statutory scheme in cases where the unit would retain a reversionary in-
terest. The opinion points out that the statute contemplates transferring reclaimed land to local
government units only if the unit in question prepares and submits a land use plan to the
Council. In the attorney general's opinion, this condition could be circumvented if the local
government unit can obtain possession of the land via the reversionary interest. Id. Such an
argument does not arise when the leasehold is obtained from a fee owner other than a local
government. It can be argued that the "acquisition" requirement is designed to give the Council
a sufficient right to enter upon and reclaim the premises, and its scope should be examined
from that standpoint. On the other hand, it can be argued that the authority given to purchase
less than fee interests is such that in instances where the Council already owns the fee it can, for
example, acquire an outstanding easement whose existence might otherwise impede an effective
reclamation program. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § 4610 (1977). Thus, the specific authority to
acquire less than a fee interest is not necessarily a statement that ownership of less than a fee
will be sufficient to allow the Council to proceed with a reclamation project.
217. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § 4614 (1977).
218. It may be profitable to examine the program established under Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1237(h) (Supp. 1 1977).
219. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § 4614 (1977).
220. Id.
221. P.A. 81-1020, § 2.04, 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. at 2665 (West).
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burden of the increase in value attributable to the reclamation. 222 In gen-
eral, under the 1979 Act the Department of Mines and Minerals is to ad-
minister a reclamation program under the direction of the Council. 223 More
specifically, the Council must designate the abandoned lands to be re-
claimed, 224 determine which of those lands are to be acquired, 2 25 and estab-
lish by rule the criteria for making these reclamation and acquisition deci-
sions. 226  The Council also must determine the manner of reclamation and
the uses to which the land will be put after reclamation. 227 In addition to
the foregoing mandatory duties, the Council "may" provide for "the filling of
voids and sealing of tunnels, shafts and entryways and reclamation of the
surface impacts of underground or surface mines,"2 2 8 and it "may" develop
criteria for project evaluation that goes beyond the priorities set out in the
statute. 229
Despite the new Act's greater specification of Council duties, the old Act's
Council Program Review and Planning Document 2 30 could serve as the
framework for accomplishing both the mandates and the discretionary duties
of the 1979 Act. This document and the regulations promulgated thereunder
provide a list of priorities and weighted values that enable the Council to
evaluate potential projects in order to decide which ones to undertake. 231
These priorities have been incorporated into the 1979 Act. 232 Priority I is
the "[p]rotection of public health, safety, and the general welfare from ex-
treme danger resulting from the adverse effects of mining practices." 2 33
This priority guideline includes a nonexclusive list of ten conditions that can
result in "extreme danger," such as "[e]xtreme contamination of a drinking
water supply."2 34 A maximum of 500 points can be assigned to these condi-
tions in calculating a project's priority. 235 The lower priority conditions are
222. Id. §§ 2,04(c), 2.09(a), 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. at 2666-67. While § 2.04(c) states broadly
that "moneys expended for such work and the benefits accruing to any such premises ... shall
be chargeable against such land," § 2.09(a) makes it clear that any lien against the property to
recoup such expenditures is not to exceed the increase in market value of property. The Act
also establishes how this increase is to be determined and sets up a protest procedure.
223. Id. § 1.05, 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. at 2664.
224. Id. § 2.01, 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. at 2664.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. § 2.02(a), 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. at 2664.
228. Id. § 2.02(b), 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. at 2664.
229. Id. § 2.03(b), 1979 III. Legis. Serv. at 2665.
230. ABANDONED MINED LANDS RECLAMATION COUNCIL, PROGRAM REVIEW AND PLANNING
DOCUMENT (March 7, 1978).
231. 2 I11. Reg. 179-90 (No. 34 1978). The Abandoned Mined Lands Reclamation Council is a
part of the Illinois Department of Mines and Minerals. Id.
232. P.A. 81-1020, § 2.03(a) 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. at 2665 (West). These priorities are taken
from the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1233 (Supp.
1 1977).
233. 2 Ill. Reg. 184 (No. 34 1978).




those contained in Priority V and Priority VI, where each condition can be
assigned only a maximum of five points . 2 3 6  These priority guidelines par-
ticularize thirty different factors or conditions, 237 but only contain two
specific references to subsidence problems, 238 further illustrating the diffi-
culty of applying the 1975 Act to subsidence problems. Specifically, Priority
I recognizes "[s]ubsidence damage to water supply, sewage or gas lines" 2 39
and Priority V recognizes the "[d]egree of damage to a public facility due to
subsidence." 2
40
It may be inferred from reading the language of both the 1979 Act and the
guidelines developed under the 1975 Act that subsidence control or rehabili-
tation projects will receive substantial competition from reclamation projects
unrelated to subsidence. This result is to be expected because these laws
were not designed to deal exclusively with subsidence problems, if at
all. 241 The priority system will determine which projects are chosen for
subsidence control or rehabilitation. To date, the Council has initiated only
three projects, none of which have dealt with subsidence. 242
The program's evolution will depend largely upon federal requirements
because the primary purpose in passing the 1979 Act was to "satisfy the
requirements of the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 . . .which makes this State eligible for funds for reclamation of aban-
doned lands and waters under that Act." a2 4 3  The federal Act provided that
monies from this fund could be used for the "prevention, abatement, and
control of coal mine subsidence." 2 44  Thus, the Illinois Act should be inter-
preted broadly to allow the use of funds for these purposes. A distinction can
be drawn between expending funds to repair damage once subsidence has
occurred and expending funds to prevent, abate, or control subsidence once
it begins but before it has run its course. 245  The statement of purposes for
236. Id. at 189. Priority V is "[tihe protection, repair, replacement, construction, or en-
hancement of public facilities such as utilities, roads, recreation, and conservation facilities ad-
versely affected by past mining development." Id. An illustrative Priority V condition is the
"[d]egree of damage to a public road or bridge due to mine-related trucking operations." Id.
237. id.
238. id.
239. Id. at 185.
240. Id. at 189.
241. See text accompanying notes 206-09 supra.
242. Telephone Interview with Mr. Al Grosboll, Executive Director, Abandoned Mined
Lands Reclamation Council (November 30, 1978). While the first two projects initiated con-
cerned surface effects of underground mines, these effects involved gob piles and drainage prob-
lems. The third project involved a surface mine.
243. P.A. 81-1020, § 1.02(b), 1979 II. Legis. Serv. at 2663 (West). See also notes 212 and 232
supra.
244. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1231(c)(1) (Supp. I
1977), establishing the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund.
245. This is consistent with the language found in the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act of 1977 that specifically states that "no part of the funds provided under this title may
be used to pay the actual construction costs of housing." 30 U.S.C. § 1237(h) (Supp. 1 1977). As
the legislative history points out, however, affected land, including damaged structures, can be
purchased using the funds and then the seller can use the money received to buy another
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passing the 1979 Act also identified another major defect of the 1975 Act-a
lack of sufficient funding to carry out the goals of the Act, particularly if
these goals include dealing with subsidence. 246 The adoption of the 1979
Act cures this defect by making Illinois eligible for federal funding to pre-
vent, abate, and control subsidence.
The net result is that while the definitions of the 1975 Act may be broad
enough to allow the Council to deal with subsidence problems, as a practical
matter, other aspects of the law do not effectively address such problems.
The 1979 Act removes some of these barriers, particularly by eliminating the
necessity of acquiring title to the land to be reclaimed. The 1979 legislation,
however, does not create any new technology, nor does it make present
technology less expensive. Because technological and economic factors 247 are
an integral part of the balancing process the Council performs when deciding
which projects it will undertake, 248 it is likely that subsidence projects will
receive a low priority. Consequently, what the Council does may depend on
what funds become available to it as a result of the federal Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977249 and what strings are attached to the
use of those funds.
house. H.R. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 100, reprinted ill [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD NEws 728, 732. The federal Office of Surface Mining has agreed to use funds for these types
of purposes, at least under some circumstances. See, e.g., Repairs to Begin on Sink-Damaged
Homes, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, Oct. 12, 1979, at 3, col. 3 (to place permanent supports under
house); U.S. to Reimburse Energy Family $1,500 Spent on Mine Sink Damnage, SOUTHERN IL-
LINOISAN, Aug. 23, 1979, at 3, col. 1 (homeowner to be reimbursed for shoring up costs). See also
Subsidence Paynent Paves Way; Fowlers' Suffering Will Help Others, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, Aug.
26, 1979, at 22, col. 1.
246. In the original appropriation bill for the Council, the General Assembly specified
$2,500,000. Governor Walker reduced this figure to $100,000, which he considered sufficient
'to get the new program under the way." 1974 I11. Laws 1451. In the Act, which took effect on
July 1, 1975, the General Assembly appropriated "$1,500,000 or so much thereof as may be
necessary . . . for land acquisition, land reclamation and other expenses connected with ad-
ministering and effectuating the purposes of the 'Abandoned Mined Lands Reclamation Act.'
1975 I11. Laws 732.
247. See, e.g., priorities II-F, III-E, 2 I11. Reg. 185-87 (No. 34 1978).
248. P.A. 81-1020, § 2.03(b), 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. 2665 (West). The Act also states "the
program shall be administered to provide the most effective use in this State of abandoned mine
reclamation funds under the Federal Act." Id. § 1.05, 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. 2664.
The decision-making process has been carried forward with the publication of ILLINOIS IN-
STITUTE OF NATURAL RESOURCES, DECISION ANALYSIS FOR ABANDONED MINE RECLAMATION
SITE SELECTION AND PLANNING (1979). This study is replete with data and discusses exten-
sively (1) a modelling framework for site selection and planning, (2) quantification of environ-
mental, social, and political impacts, (3) regional water quality considerations, and (4) economic
benefits from reclamation.
249. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 1 1977). As of September 30, 1978, $2,328,218 were
available for Illinois in the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECY
OF THE INTERIOR UNDER THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977, at
43 (1978). This report also identified a work-initiated, high-priority subsidence project at O'Fal-
Ion, Illinois to which $100,000 had been allocated and a tentatively approved project at Belle-
ville, Illinois to which $120,000 had been allocated, 1d. at 44-45.
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Another important influence on the Council will be the outcome of pilot
project studies authorized by Illinois Public Act 80-1. 250 This Act, which
became effective March 23, 1977, is the first Illinois Act to deal exclusively
with subsidence problems. It was enacted so that the state may qualify for a
three to five million dollar federal mine subsidence control pilot project that
would attempt to halt subsidence in areas around Belleville and Maryville,
Illinois. 251 The Act itself, however, says nothing about a federal project. It
is drafted in general terms and authorizes the Illinois Mining Board to hold
hearings to determine if subsidence in an abandoned mine has caused, or is
likely to cause, damage to surface structures, or constitutes a danger to pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare. 252 If such a finding is made and the condi-
tion is not remedied within thirty days after publication of the findings, an
authorized representative of the Illinois Department of Mines and Minerals
has the right to enter any portion of the abandoned mine to perform refilling
"or such other remedial work as is deemed necessary by the Depart-
ment."'2 53  Although the Act does not define an abandoned mine, it does
provide specifically that it will not relieve any mine owner or operator of
legal responsibilities otherwise imposed by law.2 54
To date, the only pilot projects pursued under the Act have been those
initially intended with its passage. 25 Nevertheless, because of the general
terms of the Act, it might be a useful tool for the Department of Mines and
Minerals in the future. Although the 1977 Act appears to duplicate to some
extent the 1979 Abandoned Mined Lands and Waters Reclamation Act, 2 56
there are some significant differences. For example, the 1977 Act gives the
director of the department the authority to enter the property in question
and take temporary remedial action without notice or a hearing if he or she
determines that "irreparable injury will result unless immediate action is
taken." 257 There is no comparable provision in the 1979 Act. 258 Further-
more, the 1977 Act gives the mine owner or operator the opportunity to
take remedial action before the department intervenes as long as no impend-
250. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, §§ 3404-3405 (1977).
251. SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, Mar. 24, 1977, at 13, col. 1; SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, Mar. 23,
1977, at 2, col. 5.
252. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § 3404 (1977).
253. Id.
254. Id. § 3405.
255. Efforts under the federal projects have met with mixed results in filling aban-
doned underground tunnels with mine wastes and fly ash. See Mine Subsidence Projects
Continue Despite Setbacks, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, July 19, 1978, at 12, col. 1.
256. The 1977 Act was passed because some of the land to be worked on in the federal
project was in private ownership and the owners could not be located. Thus, some method to
obtain consent had to be established. The 1979 Abandoned Mined Lands and Water Reclama-
tion Act now provides for proceeding without consent to complete rehabilitation projects. P.A.
81-1020, § 2.04, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2665 (West).
257. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § 3404 (1977).
258. Entry and consent provisions under the 1979 Illinois Act essentially repeat the provi-




ing irreparable injury exists. 259 This type of provision might be more ap-
propriate in the 1979 Act because under that act the department can impose
a lien against the property for its improved value. 260 A property owner may
want to avoid this type of lien by taking the necessary remedial action him-
self or herself. Perhaps the major defect with the 1977 Act is that the Min-
ing Board, 26 1 a different entity than the Abandoned Mined Lands Reclama-
tion Council, makes the findings regarding the threat of damage to surface
structures and danger to public health, safety, and welfare. 262 This designa-
tion of the Mining Board as the body to deal with subsidence problems is
further evidence that the legislature did not contemplate that its 1975 crea-
tion, the Abandoned Mined Lands Reclamation Council, had any authority
concerning subsidence problems. A strong argument can be made that Il-
linois' efforts at dealing with abandoned mine problems should not be so
fragmentized and that the two acts should be integrated.
Subsidence Insurance
Public Act 80-1413,263 effective November 29, 1979,264 amended the Il-
linois Insurance Code 265 to make insurance available, as of October 1,
1979,266 that will cover losses caused by mine subsidence. 267 This Act can
be profitably analyzed in its coverage, funding, administration and its ap-
proach to subrogation, and compared, where appropriate, with the legisla-
259. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § 3404 (1977).
260. P.A. 81-1020, § 2.09, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2667 (West).
261. The Mining Board consists of six mine officers, three who represent employers and
three who represent employees, plus the Director of the Department of Mines and Minerals.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 5.04 (1977).
262. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § 3404 (1977).
263. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.401-414 (Supp. 1978).
264. The Act was originally to be effective on January 1, 1979, conditional upon subsequent
funding legislation, id. at § 1065.401, which was never enacted. In 1979, the General Assembly
deleted these conditions, P.A. 81-1178, § 801, 1979 III. Legis. Serv. 3143 (West), and the Act
became effective November 29, 1979. 1979 11. Legis. Serv. 3145 (West).
265. ILL, REV. STAT. ch. 73 (1977).
266. Id. § 1065.404 (Supp. 1978). Although the conditions stipulated in the original Act, see
note 264 supra, were not satisfied by October 1, 1979, the amendatory legislation retained the
original October 1, 1979, date. That should be sufficient to constitute retroactive approval for
the state program, which commenced after October 1, but before the amendatory law became
effective. P.A. 81-1178, 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. 3144 (West). If the Governor had not exercised
his amendatory veto power to make the bill effective immediately upon passage rather than on
July 1, 1980, the state's program might have been in jeopardy from October 1979 until July
1980. See Governor's Veto May Speed Mine Subsidence Insurance, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN,
Sept. 28, 1979, at 32.
267. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.404 (Supp. 1978). Mine subsidence is defined as:
loss caused by lateral or vertical movement, including collapse which results there-
from, of structures from collapse of man-made underground mines, including, but
not limited to coal mines, clay mines, limestone mines, and fluorspar mines. Loss
caused by earthquake, landslide, volcanic eruption or collapse or [sic] storm and
[Vol. 29:383418
MINE SUBSIDENCE
tion of Pennsylvania, 2 68 the only other state to enact a subsidence insurance
statute.
1. Coverage
Although the Act mandates insurance coverage of losses caused by mine
subsidence, the coverage required varies for different geographical areas. In
thirty-four Illinois counties, 269 every new or renewed policy directly insur-
ing a structure must include subsidence insurance at a separately stated
premium, 270 while in other counties, such insurance must merely be made
available. 271 Although the Act makes subsidence insurance available
throughout the state, it also limits its broad geographic coverage by allowing
an insured to waive coverage in those thirty-four counties where inclusion is
automatic. 272 This waiver must, however, be written. 273
Coverage in Illinois is further limited to "structures," 274 defined as "any
dwelling, building or fixture permanently affixed to realty, but . . . not ...
land, trees, plants, and crops."-275  This definition presents two problems. If
the phrase "permanently affixed to realty" applies to dwellings and buildings
as well as to fixtures, a question arises whether mobile homes, corncribs,
and other farm buildings on skids are insurable. Furthermore, because land,
trees, plants, and crops have been specifically excluded, a question arises
whether the legislature intended fixtures such as power lines, paved roads,
and tiled drainage systems to be insured. To the extent that subsidence
insurance is available only through existing insurance policies on struc-
sewer drains and rapid transit tunnels is specifically excepted.
P.A. 81-1178, § 802(2), 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. 3143 (West).
268. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3206 (Purdon Supp. 1979). The Pennsylvania prog-
ram was instituted in 1961. Id.
269. Although the Act does not specify 34 counties, it calls for automatic coverage in all
counties but then gives the facility and the director the authority to exclude certain counties.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.404-.405 (Supp. 1978). This exclusionary authority has been
used to exclude from automatic coverage those counties with less than one percent of the sur-
face undermined. Telephone interview with Mr. Al Grosboll, Executive Director, Abandoned Mined
Lands Reclamation Council (Sept. 28, 1979). The 1979 amendment added a mandatory exemp-
tion from automatic coverage in any county with 1,000,000 or more inhabitants and any con-
tiguous county. P.A. 81-1178, § 805, 1979 I11. Legis. Serv. 3144 (West).
270. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.404 (Supp. 1978).
271. Id. § 1065.403(b).
272. Id. § 1065.404.
273. Id. In Pennsylvania, insurance is available only through application. 52 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3212 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
274. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.403(b), 1065.404 (Supp. 1978). Pennsylvania law origi-
nally protected only "homeowners," 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (Purdon 1966), but was
amended to extend coverage to owners of structures, without defining structure. 52 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3212 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
275. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.402(6) (Supp. 1978).
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tures,2 76 this question can be answered by determining whether current
policies insure power lines and paved roads.
In addition, the Act limits required insurance coverage to a maximum of
$50,000. 277 While this amount will probably cover most, if not all, damage
to individual houses, it may be insufficient to protect adequately multi-family
units, commercial buldings, and public facilities such as schools. 278 If the
Act's maximum amount of coverage is not increased at a later date to insure
these facilities adequately, perhaps experience under the Act will convince
private insurance carriers to offer policies in excess of the statutory
amount. 279
The Act not only places a ceiling on coverage, but it also establishes a
variable deductible, ranging from a minimum of $250 to a maximum of $500
based on two percent of the policy's total insured value. 280 In other words,
the $500 deductible goes into effect when coverage is $25,000 and the $250
deductible applies to coverage of $12,500 and below. Between $12,500 and
$25,000, the deductible will vary. While the legislatively-declared deductible
found in the Illinois Act 281 creates more certainty in coverage, it does not
give the consumer the flexibility in premium alternatives usually associated
with varying deductible amounts. 28 2
Finally, even if the insured does not waive coverage, seeks to ensure a
structure that fits the statute's definition and that can be adequately insured
for $50,000, and is willing to assure the deductible amount, an insurer can
refuse coverage when prior subsidence has occurred. The Act permits an
insurer to refuse to cover a structure completed after October 1, 1979, if the
land underlying that structure experienced mine subsidence before the con-
276. After October 1, 1979, the Act requires "every policy issued or renewed insuring on a
direct basis a structure" to provide subsidence insurance. Id. § 1065.404. The Act further
defines policy to mean "a contract of insurance providing 'Basic Property Insurance' as defined
by Section 523 of this Code." Id. § 1065.402(4). Another section of the Act, however, provides
that the "fund shall make available insurance coverage against mine subsidence to all persons
within this State as to any structure within this State." Id. § 1065.403(b). Thus, there is no
requirement that the person have any other kind of insurance.
277. Id. § 1065.404.
278. See note 3 su p ra.
279. Insurers are expressly permitted to insure in excess of $50,000. P.A. 81-1178, § 804,
1979 I11. Legis. Serv. 3144 (West). Although the Pennsylvania statute does not contain a
maximum, a $50,000 maximum was imposed by regulation. 25 PA. CODE § 401.13(b) (1979).
280. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.404 (Supp. 1978). If "total insured value" relates to the
policy coverage regardless of the amount of subsidence insurance carried, the situation can exist
where minimal subsidence coverage will bear the maximum deductible. Thus, a house other-
wise insured for $75,000 but carrying $10,000 in subsidence insurance would have a $500 de-
ductible. However, if "total insured value" merely relates to the total amount of subsidence
insurance coverage, here $10,000, the deductible would be $250. The language of P.A. 81-1178,
§ 804, 1979 III. Legis. Serv. 3144 (West), suggests that the latter interpretation is correct.
281. Although the Pennsylvania statute does not provide for a deductible, the regulations
require a deductible to be included in every policy, but do not specify the amount. 25 PA.
CODE § 401.22 (1979).
282. Conceivably, the deductible could affect the number of persons who waive coverage.
See text accompanying notes 272-73 supra.
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struction2 83 and if it is likely that any future damage will not be "mini-
mal."'2 84  An insurer can also refuse to cover any structure damaged by sub-
sidence until repairs are made. 285
2. Funding
The manner in which a program is funded will often help determine its
effectiveness. Indeed, a dispute about funding delayed the initial implemen-
tation of the Illinois subsidence insurance program, 2 8 6 and, reflecting this
dispute, the bill passed contained three alternative means of funding the
insurance program, from which the legislature was required to choose before
the bill was to become effective. 287 Each of these options contemplated
some subsidizing of the program by the state;2 8 8 however, in 1979, the legis-
lature eliminated these funding options, choosing to rely entirely on pre-
miums. 289 To get the program started, the Act provides for initial advances
to establish an initial pool for administration costs and for paying early claims
until such time as the premiums from the policies can be used to cover both
administration and pay-off costs. 290 Specifically, the Act provides for the
state initially to advance the fund of $100,000.291 Whenever the fund ba-
lance falls below $50,000, the director can advance additional monies, up to
a $50,000 balance, 292 to pay claims, but the maximum state advancement is
283. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.406 (Supp. 1978). The insurer must "'provide evidence"
and needs the facility's approval before any such refusal can be made. Id.
284. Id. Here the burden is on the owner of the structure to provide "reasonable evidence."
Id. It is not clear why a structure owner must provide "reasonable evidence" while an insurer
need only "provide evidence." See note 283 supra.
285. Id. While the Pennsylvania statute does not provide for these types of exclusions, regu-
lations allow them when previous subsidence damage has not been repaired, 25 PA. CODE §
4 01.11(e) (1979), or, in lieu of requiring repair, the insurer can impose a deductible in the
policy equal to the repair cost. Id.
286. See Bickering Bogs Mine Subsidence Bill, SoUrHERN ILLINOISAN, June 23, 1977, at 8,
col. 3; Sales Tax Would Help Pay Mine Subsidence Insurance, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, April 8,
1977, at 7, col. 4; Mine Subsidence Bill Gets Finishing Touch, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, April 1,
1977, at 12, col. 1.
287. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.401 (Supp. 1978). See note 264 supra.
288. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.403(c) 8(l) (1978). To keep the premiums low enough to make the
insurance aflordable and to minimize the insurance company losses, it was anticipated that the
program would be subsidized by up to two million dollars from state tax funds. Sales Tax Would
Help Pay Mine Subsidence Insurance, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, April 8, 1977, at 7, col. 4.
289. P.A. 81-1178, § 801, 1979 111. Legis. Serv. 3143 (West) (striking ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73,§ 73, §§ 1065.401, 403(f) (Supp. 1978) (in so far as they relate to funding, and modifying §
1065.403(c). Id. Although the 1979 amendment does not, however, provide for reimbursement
from the fund to the insurance department for its administrative costs, it does specifically re-
quire the reimbursement of facility administrative costs from the fund. P.A. 81-1178, § 807,
1979 II1. Legis. Serv. 3143 (West). Thus, to the extent that the insurance department is in-
volved in the enterprise, the state underwrites some part of the program's cost.




$500, 000.293 Any advanced funds are to be repaid in equal installments
during each of three years, 294 beginning with calendar year 1984.295
By contrast, the Pennsylvania subsidence insurance statute originally pro-
vided that the program's administration and the payment of claims were to
be financed by a one million dollar state appropriation as well as by any
premiums collected. 296 The law was then amended to provide for the pay-
ment of administration expenses from the department's general appropria-
tion, 297 resulting in a substantial and permanent state subsidy of the insur-
ance program. In addition, if a mine subsidence emergency arises, the
Pennsylvania governor has authority to transfer a maximum of two million
dollars to the fund for various forms of mine subsidence emergency relief. 298
In Illinois, initial premiums for subsidence insurance have been set at six
dollars for the first $10,000 of coverage and one dollar for each additional
$10,000 of coverage up to the $50,000 maximum, yielding a total premium of
ten dollars. 299 In Pennsylvania, however, comparable coverage premiums
are from fifty to one hundred dollars. 300 Although it is not entirely clear
why such a substantial premium disparity should exist, Illinois officials con-
cede that their premium rates are the result of guesswork. 3o It is clear
that the Act's purpose should not be frustrated by inadequate premiums,
and thus, inadequate funding. The legislature stated that premium rates
must be sufficient "to satisfy all foreseeable claims upon the Fund ...and to
provide a reasonable reserve fund for unexpected contingencies."- 30 2  If
monies are not available in the state fund to reimburse them, then insurers
293. Id. § 803a(b).
294. Id. § 803a(c). The director's authority to make advancements expires on March 31, 1982.
Id.
295. ld.
296. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3224 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
297. Id. § 3205.
298. Id. § 3241. The funds shall be used for matching federal funds for mine subsidence
relief, to move people whose homes are destroyed or endangered until they are repaired or
substitute residences are located, and to provide loans with two percent maximum interest for
repair or replacement of homes. Id.
299. See Subsidence Insurance 'Cheap' and Available Now, Official Says, SOUTHERN IL-
LINOISAN, Oct. 4, 1979, at 3, col. 1; Subsidence Insurance Rates Ok'd, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN,
Sept. 30, 1979, at 27, col. 4. This premium is for frame construction. There is a two dollar
differential for masonry construction resulting in a total premium of $12 for full coverage. Id.
300. See Subsidence Insurance 'Cheap' and Available Now, Official Says, SOUTHERN IL-
LINOISAN, Oct. 4, 1979, at 3, col. 1. The Pennsylvania regulations provide that premiums can-
not be less than $15 for residential structures or $25 for commercial structures. 25 PA. CODE
§ 401.13(a) (1979). Pennsylvania residential rates are said to range from $15 to $51 for $5,000 to
$50,000 coverage respectively and are said to be set at $200 for $50,000 coverage for commer-
cial structures. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ALTERNATIVES TO PROTECT
PROPERTY OWNERS FROM DAMAGES CAUSED BY MINE SUBSIDENCE 30 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as COMPTROLLER GENERAL ALTERNATIVES].
301. See Mine Subsidence Insurance Will Be Available Oct. 1, Forms or Not, SOUTHERN
ILLINOISAN, September 24, 1979, at 7, col. 1; Area Coal-Mine Subsidence Insurance Starts in
October, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, August 19, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
302. P.A. 81-1178, § 803(e), 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3144 (West).
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need not pay off claims. 33 Thus, it is critical to the Act's purpose that
sufficient premiums be determined. Because there is only the Pennsylvania
experience to consider in setting premiums, which Illinois has apparently
rejected, there should be an opportunity during 1980304 to review the
adequacy of Illinois premiums and to make adjustments if necessary. 305
3. Administration
The effectiveness of a statutory program also will be affected by the man-
ner in which it is to be administered. While the Pennsylvania insurance
subsidence program is run entirely by the state, the Illinois system requires
the cooperation of the insurance industry. Specifically, in Illinois private in-
surance carriers write subsidence insurance policies, for which they receive
"ceding commissions." 30 6  They settle subsequent claims and are then
reimbursed by the state fund. 307 Thus, although Illinois has reduced ad-
ministrative costs, it loses part of the premium, which otherwise would go
into the state fund, to private insurance companies. In addition, it is not
clear under the Illinois scheme what incentive an insurer has to negotiate
with an insured who submits a claim for loss, because the insurer is entitled
to full reimbursement from the fund as a matter of right except in cases of
fraud. 30 An insurer would save administrative costs by simply paying the
claim and requesting reimbursement. Moreover, the only recourse against a
paid insured occurs when there is fraud or a violation of the policy's condi-
tions. 309
Furthermore, in Illinois, the Director of the Department of Insurance 3 10
and the Industry Placement Facility supervise the subsidence insurance
program. 311 In Pennsylvania, however, the program is overseen by the
Coal and Clay Mine Subsidence Insurance Board, 3 12 whose members are
303. Id. § 807.
304, Because advances by the state are to be terminated on March 31, 1982, id. § 803(c), it is
necessary for the premiums to be adjusted before that time to ensure a sufficient cash flow.
305. The facility is under a mandatory duty to "periodically review" the premiums and ex-
periences, and "to make changes as required." Id. § 803(d).
306. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.407 (Supp. 1978). The ceding commission is to be
uniform and to be "based on reasonable administrative costs to the insurers, including agents'
commissions." P.A. 81-1178, § 808, 1979 111. Legis. Serv. 3145 (West).
307. ILL. REV. STAr. ch. 73, § 1065.407 (Supp. 1978).
308. Id. § 1054.411(1) (Supp. 1978). Perhaps the statutory reference that "the company is
authorized to settle losses in the customary manner" will give sufficient regulatory authority to
see that unnecessary pay-offs are not made. Id. (emphasis added).
309. id. § 1065.411(2).
310. Id. § 1065.413.
311. Id. § 1065.401. The Industry Placement Facility is
the organization formed by insurers licensed to write and engaged in writing basic
property insurance .. .within the State of Illinois to assist applicants in urban areas
in securing basic property insurance and to formulate and administer a program for
the equitable apportionment among such insurers of such basic property insurance.
id. § 1065.70(4).
312. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Formerly, this board was called
the Anthracite and Bituminous Coal Mine Subsidence Board.
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the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Resources, the Commis-
sioner of Insurance, and the State Treasurer. 313 The secretary chairs the
board, which emphasizes that the Pennsylvania subsidence insurance scheme
is both an integral part of and coordinate with the Environmental Resources
Department's other subsidence control activities. By contrast, the Illinois
Act does not refer to the Illinois Department of Mines and Minerals, which
is the Illinois counterpart of Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental
Resources. Therefore. the Illinois system for administering the subsidence
insurance program may be hampered by its delegation to private insurance
companies of the responsibility to write policies and settle claims as well as
its failure comprehensively to integrate all state activities regarding subsi-
dence control. One alternative not adopted in Illinois is Pennsylvania's sys-
tem of total state administration.
4. Subrogation
Although the administration of Illinois' subsidence insurance program may
prove to limit the program's effectiveness, both the Pennsylvania 314 and Il-
linois 315 laws allow the state fund to be subrogated for the insured's claims
against those responsible for the subsidence. 316 While an individual claim-
ant, particularly one with a small claim, might be unwilling or unable to
undertake the time and expense of litigation against a mine operator, the
fund will usually be in a much better position to pursue the mine operator
as it may be required to pay several claims arising from the same subsi-
dence. Thus, this subrogation feature may assist in holding mine operators
responsible.
Insurers in Illinois also retain the right of subrogation, and they are re-
quired to report semi-annually concerning subrogation losses and remit net
recoveries from subrogation actions to the Industry Placement Facility. 317
Remittance of all monies recovered would, however, seem inappropriate in
cases where the insurer has insured in excess of $50,000, the statutory
maximum, 318 and has paid a claim in excess of that amount. In this situa-
tion, the insurer should have to remit only up to, but not beyond, the
$50,000 paid out by the fund. It is not clear why insurers would bring sub-
rogation actions, except in instances where they have paid a claim in excess
of $50,000, because they receive no special compensation for doing so.
In short, with Public Act 80-1413, 319 Illinois has undertaken a laudable
effort to require insurance against subsidence damage. Although this effort
313. 1d. The Secretary of Mines and Minerals Industries has held a position on the Board, but
this position was abolished and replaced by the position of Secretary of Environmental Re-
sources. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 66 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
314. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3217 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
315. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.412 (Supp. 1978).
316. The insured should retain his or her claim to the loss represented by the deductible, see
note 280 and accompanying text supra, and to any loss in excess of the policy's limits.
317. Id. § 1065.412(1), (3).
318. Id. 9 1065.404.
319. Id. 99 1065.401-.414.
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is, perhaps, less comprehensive than ultimately desirable, it is a sound first
step.
Research
Public Act 80-1436, 320 which became effective September 15, 1978, re-
quires the Illinois Institute for Environmental Quality (Institute)321 to re-
view "existing underground mining practices, mine subsidence problems,
technologies designed to prevent mine subsidence, and any other available
information pertaining to the relationship between mining practices and
mine subsidence." 3 22 Although this review was to be completed before De-
cember 31, 1979, the date the Institute is to report to the General Assem-
bly, 323 it has not yet been submitted. This report must contain its findings
and recommend legislation necessary to protect Illinois property owners
from mine subsidence. 324 In connection with the review and report, the
Act further requires the Institute to review the "laws and rules and regula-
tions of other governmental units which are designed to prevent mine subsi-
dence."325  It is not clear, however, which governmental units are to be
included in this review.
The Act also provides for the Institute to review the status of underground
mine maps, statutory references to public access to underground mine in-
formation, and the availability of underground mining information to county
clerks and recorders of deeds. Based on this study, the Institute is to report
to the general assembly "its findings and recommendations for legislation to
provide citizens access to underground mining information." 326  The most
critical need seems to be to allow the public access to information already
available at the county recorders' offices in the form of underground mine
maps.3 27  The public needs such access in order to enable it to make in-
formed decisions about whether to purchase land and whether to buy the
subsidence insurance Illinois has recently made available to it. 328
Future Mining
The Illinois General Assembly passed two acts designed to enable Illinois
to comply with the requirements and programs of the federal Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 as it relates to future mining within the
state.329  The first Act 33 0 authorizes Illinois' participation in the temporary
320. Act of Sept. 15, 1978, P.A. 80-1436, Ill. Laws 1659.
321. This institute now is called the Illinois Institute of Natural Resources. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 96 1/2, §§ 7401-7407 (Supp. 1978).
322. Act of Sept. 15, 1978, P.A. 80-1436, § 1, 1978 Il1. Laws 1659.
323. Id.
324. Id. See text accompanying notes 381-446 infra.
325. Act of Sept. 15, 1978, P.A. 80-1436, § 2, 1978 11. Laws 1659.
326. id. § 2, 1978 Il1. Laws at 1659. See text accompanying notes 378-443 infra.
327. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
328. See text accompanying notes 263-319 supra.
329. The Surface Coal Mining Land Conservdtion and Reclamation Act, P.A. 81-1015, 1979
Ill. Legis. Serv. 2625 (West); Act of Aug. 11, 1978, P.A. 80-1342, 1978 Il. Laws 1005.
330. Act of Aug. 11, 1978, P.A. 80-1342, 1978 11. Laws 1005.
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program 33 ' established under the federal law; the second Act332 authorizes
participation in the permanent program. 333 While the first Illinois Act in-
cludes no specific reference to subsidence, the second Illinois Act requires
mine operators to "adopt measures consistent with known technology in order
to prevent subsidence causing material damage to the extent technologically
and economically feasible, maximize mine stability, and maintain the value
and reasonably foreseeable use of surface lands .... ."334 The operative
scope of this provision, which was copied from the federal Act, appears se-
verely restricted because it excepts mining technology requiring planned
subsidence, such as long-wall mining, 335 and mandates that the Act not be
construed to prohibit standard room and pillar mining. 336
331. 30 C.F.R. § 700.1-837.16 (1979).
332. The Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act, P.A. 81-1015, 1979
Ill. Legis. Serv. 2625 (West).
333. 30 C.F.R. §§ 700.1-845.20 (1979).
334. The Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act, P.A. 81-1015, § 4.02,
1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2644 (West). This section is based on the federal Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1266(b)(1) (Supp. 1 1977). The Illinois Act also con-
tains a provision authorizing the suspension of mining in cases of "imminent danger" to inhabit-
ants of specified areas. The Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act, P.A.
81-1015, § 4.10, 1979 II1. Legis. Serv. 2645 (West). This section is based on the federal Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1266(c) (Supp. I 1977), and it has
been implemented in the federal subsidence regulations. 30 C.F.R. § 817.126(d) (1979).
335. Longwall mining is the principal method of underground mining for coal in Europe but
only accounted for two and one-half percent of underground coal production in the United
States in 1972. The method has been described as follows:
In the longwall method, most of the seam is extracted by more or less continu-
ously slicing off the coal along a series of long faces that are of the order of 300 or
more feet in length. In longwall advance mining, the coal seam is extracted as
completely as possible, progressing from the main entry toward the boundaries of
the property. In longwall retreat mining, the haulageways necessary to provide ac-
cess, service and ventilation are first driven . . . and then faces are developed to
extract the coal by retreating toward the shaft. The advance methods allow a mine
to reach full production operation soon after shafts are developed to the coal seam,
but tend to result in difficult roof control and haulageway maintenance costs. Con-
versely, retreat systems involve longer delays in start-tip and return on capital in-
vestment, but result in better working conditions, since roof collapse and associated
ground disturbances are 'left behind' the face, i.e., occur outside the active areas of
the mine.
STUDY COMMITTEE TO ASSESS THE FEASIBILITY OF RETURNING UNDERGROUND COAL MINE
NASTES TO THE MINED-OUT AREAS, UNDERGROUND DISPOSAL OF COAL MINE WASTES: A
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 38-39 (1975) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION].
336. Room and pillar mining is the traditional United States production method for under-
ground coal mining and is reported to account for over 90 % of underground coal production in
the United States in 1975. It has been described as follows:
In room and pillar mining the coal is extracted in two main stages. In the first stage
the coal is mined in a pattern of rooms separated by pillars of unmined coal. The
rooms should be wide enough to allow effective passage of mining machinery, but
narrow enough to avoid risks of roof collapse. The roof is usually reinforced by 'rock
bolting' and other forms of support to guard against roof falls. The width of the
426
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While neither the initial federal program3 3 7 nor the Illinois program3 3 8
adopted pursuant to the federal program implement these subsidence provi-
sions, 339 the federal rules for the permanent program effectuate them. 340
First, the federal rules about application for underground mine permits re-
quire the applicant to submit information regarding subsidence. 341 Second,
these rules establish some basic standards regarding mine subsidence with
which a mine permit holder must comply. 342 Each must be discussed in
turn.
pillar is such that it is at least suflcient to support the overlying rock without col-
lapse. . . .The required size of the pillar will increase as the depth of the mine
increases. Pillar dimensions are influenced by procedures used in subsequent (stage
2) extraction operations. Ideally, the entire coal seam is developed in a regular
pattern of pillars throughout the mining property. If first-stage mining only is prac-
ticed and the pillars are left in the ground, the mining method is known as 'partial
extraction.' Over 70 percent of U.S. mines practice partial extraction in at least one
section of the mine.
The second stage, pillar extraction, begins when the boundary of the working
area is reached. Coal is extracted from the pillars while 'retreating' toward the main
entry. Successive cuts are taken to remove the pillar while the miner is protected
by roof support from posts, cribs, and bolted roof. Elimination of these pillars re-
moves support from the overlying rock which consequently collapses or 'caves' into
the mined out area after the miners have moved to the next pillar.
Adopting a stepped retreat line allows pillar extraction to be carried out under
relatively safe conditions where the roof collapse does not occur within the working
area. Some danger does exist, however, and it is usually necessary to leave some
portion ('remnants') of the pillars for worker and machine protection during extrac-
tion operations. These remnants crush as the extracted region is enlarged. In this
manner the coal extraction operations progressively retreat toward the mine shaft or
main entry, removing as much of the remaining coal as possible. This is known as
'complete' extraction even though not all the coal is removed.
[T]he average percentage extraction in room and pillar mining in U.S. mines is
approximately 58 percent. This percentage decreases with the depth of mining and
the method becomes progressively less economic.
Id. at 34-37 (1975).
337. 30 C.F.R. §§ 700-837 (1977). Although underground mining general performance stan-
dards were included in the initial program, they dealt essentially with surface work areas, dis-
posal of material and waste on the surface, protection of hydrologic systems, topsoil handling
and revegetation. Id. §§ 717.11-20.
338. 3 Ill. Reg. 819-59 (No. 5 1979).
339. The federal Act also provides that the provisions of that Act relating to surface mining
State and Federal programs, permits, bonds, inspections and enforcement, public review, and
administrative and judicial review are to be applicable to surface impacts of underground mining
"with such modifications to the permit application requirements as are necessary to accommo-
date the distinct difference between surface and underground coal mining." Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1266(d) (Supp. 1 1977). For purposes of this
study, the only significant provisions relate to bonding. A review of the bonding regulations,
however, shows no meaningful adaptation to underground mining at least as applicable to surface
subsidence. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 800.1-809.12 (1979).
340. 30 C.F.R. §§ 784.20, 817.121, 817.122, 817.124, 817.126 (1979).
341. Id. § 784.21).
342. Id. 9§ 817.121, 817.122, 817.124, 817.126.
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1. Mining Permits
An applicant for an underground mining permit is required to include a
survey showing if there are any "structures or renewable resource lands"' 343
within the proposed permit area. 3 4 4 If such structures or renewable re-
source lands exist, then the survey must show whether subsidence could
cause "material damage or diminution of reasonably foreseeable use" of the
structures or renewable resource lands. 345 If the survey shows, or the reg-
ulatory authority finds, that material damage or diminution of use could re-
sult, then the applicant must submit a subsidence control plan. 346 The plan
must describe: (1) the mining methods and other actions of the operator that
might affect subsidence; 347 (2) the measures that will be taken to prevent
subsidence from causing material damage or diminution of use;348 (3) the
measures that will be taken to mitigate effects of material damage or diminu-
tion of use; 34 9 and (4) the measures that will be taken to determine the
degree of material damage or diminution of use. 350 These descriptive re-
quirements interrelate with the basic subsidence control standards estab-
lished for all underground mines holding permits.
2. Basic Subsidence Control Standards
The four sections of the regulations establishing these basic subsidence
control standards deal respectively with general requirements, 351 notice to
the public, 352 surface owner protection, 353 and buffer zones.354 The gen-
eral requirements do little more than restate the statutory language, indicat-
ing only that the prevention of subsidence can be accomplished "by leaving
adequate coal in place, backfilling, or other measures to support the surface,
or by conducting underground mining in a manner that provides for planned
and controlled subsidence." 355 The requirements also provide that the
operator must comply with the subsidence control plan submitted in his or
her application. 356 In this section, the Office of Surface Mining intended to
343. Renewable resource lands has been defined to mean "aquifers and areas for the recharge
of aquifers and other underground waters, areas for agriculture or silvicultural production of
food and fiber, and grazinglands." Id. § 701.5.
344. Id. § 784.20.
345. Id.
346. Id. The underlying assumption is that lands that are not "renewable resource lands"
now, will not become so in the future.
347. Id. § 784.20(a).
348. Id. § 784.20(b).
349. Id. § 784.20(c).
350. Id. § 784.20(d).
351. Id. § 817.121.352. Id. §817.122.
353. Id. § 817.124.
354. Id. § 817.126.
355. Id. § 817.121. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 15.075-76 (1979).
356. 30 C.F.R. § 817.121 (1979).
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make it clear that no one way to prevent or minimize the risk of subsidence
exists, and local regulatory authorities must accordingly consider the particu-
lar localities and mining operations. 357
The public-notice section provides more for notice to the owners and resi-
dents of property overlying or adjacent to a prospective mining area than it
does for notice to the public 358 The expectation is that measures to protect
against subsidence damage can be taken with at least six months notice by
mail to the surface and adjacent owners and residents. 59 For this section
to be fully effective, "property owners" must be interpreted broadly so as to
include, for example, utility easement owners. 360
The provisions on surface owner protection require a permit holder who
conducts underground mining that results in subsidence causing material
surface damage or diminution in surface use to restore or rehabilitate the
property, 36 1 purchase the property at fair market value, 3 62 or purchase an
insurance policy for the surface owner before mining begins. 363 In the
rule-promulgation process, arguments were made that the surface owner
protection requirements should not apply where the permit holder owned
the surface, or where the surface owner had consented to the mining or
waived the right to subjacent support. 364 The Office of Surface Mining re-
sponded that Congress sought to protect a broader public interest than
merely securing the rights of an individual surface owner and that the public
has an interest in the future use of the surface. 365 These regulations protect
this interest in the future use of the surface rather than the rights of indi-
vidual surface owners. Moreover, the statute expressly states that control
measures must be adopted to "maintain the value and reasonably foreseeable
use of surface lands."'3 6 6 Thus, the Office of Surface Mining clearly appears
correct in asserting that the focus of the controls should be on protecting the
integrity of the land. The secondary public concern of preventing widespread
loss to individual surface owners is not to be overlooked, however, and this
regulation in particular seeks to impose maximum responsibility on mine
permit holders in order to minimize public impact and responsibility. The
357. See 44 Fed. Reg. 15, 273 (1979).
358. Id. 30 C.F.R. § 817.122 (1979).
359. 44 Fed. Reg. 15, 274 (1979).
360. Utility protection is discussed by the Office of Surface Mining in the justification for the
rule. Id.
361. 30 C.F.R. § 817.124(b)(1) (1979).
362. Id. § 817.124(b)(2) (1979).
363. Id. § 817.124(c) (1979).
364. 44 Fed. Reg. 156, 274 (1979).
365. For a general discussion of the concept of surface owner protection, see Beck, Surface
Owner Consent Laws: The Agricultural Enterprise Versus Surface Mining for Coal, 1977 S.
ILL. U.L.J. 303.
366. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1266(b)(1) (Supp.
1 1977); The Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act, P.A. 81-1015, §
4.02, 1979 111. Legis. Serv. 2644 (West).
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focus of this rule, therefore, is not on preventing subsidence, which is the
focus of the general requirements rule, 367 but rather, on minimizing public
loss in situations where subsidence occurs despite implementation of preven-
tive measures. It recognizes that not all subsidence can be prevented, and,
of course, in some instances subsidence will even be planned. With both
considerations in mind, the rule may be too flexible by allowing three op-
tions, when the focus should be on the first option because that option not
only minimizes public loss but goes the furthest in maintaining the integrity
of the surface.
The final subsidence control standards-the buffer zone rules-limit, or
prohibit, mining beneath or adjacent to certain streams or water impound-
ments, 368 aquifers, 36 9 or public buildings. 370 In each situation, the regulat-
ory authority has discretion to allow mining if it determines that subsidence
will not cause "material damage" to the affected category of property. 371 In
addition, these rules require the suspension of mining when imminent
danger threatens urbanized areas, cities, towns or communities, industrial or
commercial buildings, major impoundments, or permanent streams. 372
State plans for implementing the federal requirements were to be submit-
ted on March 3, 1980, 373 but have not yet been completed. 374 Despite the
promulgation of final regulations for the permanent program and the submis-
sion of state plans, considerable uncertainty remains regarding the scope of
the state programs for two reasons. First, although the Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the regulations promulgated thereun-
der have been challenged in the courts, the litigation has not yet been con-
cluded. 375 Second, Congress is considering a bill that would exempt states
367. See text accompanying notes 356-57 supra.
368. 30 C.F.R. § 817.126(a) (1979).
369. Id. § 817.126(h).
370. Id. § 8 17.126(c).
371. Id. § 817.126.
372. Id. § 817.126(d). This regulation essentially restates The Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1266(c) (Supp. I 1977). See note 334 supra.
373. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, ENVIR. REP. DEC. (BNA) (13
Envir. Rep. Cas.) 1447 (D.D.C. 1979). The federal regulations had required state programs to
be submitted as of August 3, 1979. 30 C.F.R. § 731.12 (1979).
374. On February 17, 1980, it was announced that Illinois was seeking a two month extension
on the deadline. Extension Sought by State on Plan to Regulate Illinois Surface Mining,
SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, Feb. 17, 1980, at 3, col. 1. Furthermore, following submission, the
Secretary of the Interior will approve or reject the plan within a certain time, which, under the
earlier regulations, was six months. 30 C.F.R. § 732.13 (1979). When the Secretary extended
the submission deadline in response to Permanent Surface Mining, supra note 373, he merely
noted that adjustments would have to be made in the subsequent procedures and timing. Id. §
731.12. On February 11, 1980, it was announced that Texas had become the first state to have a
plan approved by the Secretary. ENVIR. REP. CURR. DEVELOP. (BNA) 2011 (1980).
375. Union Carbide Corp. v. Andrus, ENVIR. REP. DEC. (BNA) (13 ENVIR. REP. CAS.) 1481
(S.D.W. Va. 1979); Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc. v. Andrus, 12 ENVIR. REP.
CAS. 1795 (W.D. Va. 1979), revd, ENVIR. REP. DEC. (BNA) (13 Envir. Rep. Cas.) 1554 (4th
Cir. 1979); In re Surface Mining Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978); In re Surface
Mining Regulation Litigation, 425 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1978).
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from having to comply with the federal regulations and would require only
compliance with the Act itself. 376 Although passage of this bill might create
substantial chaos concerning enforcement of much of the federal act, 377 it
should have little effect on the subsidence aspects as these regulations
clearly follow the tenor and intent of the Act, and it is, thus, difficult to
imagine the states complying with the Act without conforming to the regula-
tions.
WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
Because future developments in subsidence law will evolve from or within
the already-existing common law and legislative contexts, this section will
refer to critical factors raised in the common law and legislative discussions.
This past versus future analysis requires separate consideration of each of the
three basic approaches to dealing with subsidence: preventing subsidence
from occurring in the first instance, preventing harm from taking place when
subsidence does occur, and providing relief from harm that does take place
when subsidence occurs.
Preventing Subsidence
When considering prevention of subsidence, it is necessary to review the
state of the art, the costs involved, and the legal requirements. Each of
these elements must be examined in the context of abandoned versus active
mines.
1. State of the Art
Technologies for preventing subsidence practicable during the active min-
ing process have been used in Europe for many years. In 1974, a major
review of subsidence technologies concluded that the European methods
should be adaptable to use in the United States, but further study was
deemed necessary to assess their adaptability. 378 This same review con-
cluded that the relative effectiveness of the technologies for stabilizing the
surface above abandoned mines was based on "conjecture." 3 79
When dealing with an abandoned mine, it must be determined whether
anything needs to be done as the subsidence already may be complete or
arrested, the void may be of sufficient depth that no subsidence will occur,
or there may be pillars sufficient to prevent subsidence. 3 0  While
376. S. 1403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1979). This bill passed the Senate on a 68-26 vote.
See125 CONG. REC. S12,387 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979).
377. This is due principally to the considerable vagueness in the federal act.
378. GENERAL ANALYTIC, INC., STATE OF THE ART OF SUBSIDENCE CONTROL 11-76 to 11-77
(1974) [hereinafter cited as GENERAL ANALYTICS].
379. Id. at 1-57. "Ideally surface stabilization would permanently eliminate any subsidence
movement. From a practical viewpoint, this goal is seldom achieved. Realistically, surface
stabilization either reduces subsidence movements, or postpones movements until some later
time, possibly far in the future." Id. at 1-2.
380. For a general discussion of these categories, see GENERAL ANALYTICS, supra note 378,
at 1-6 to 1-13.
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techniques for making these determinations exist, 381 it is necessary to know
the size, shape, and continuity of the voids and the conditions and nature of
the overburden, the mine pillars, and the mine floor. Similarly, in connec-
tion with active mines it must be considered whether any control efforts are
needed. This determination largely will be a function of the depth of the
operation. 382
All authorities concur that geological conditions and mineral extraction
methods affect the eventuality of and the time for subsidence. 3 3  Given
the variable geological conditions and extraction methods present in the
United States, the occurrence of subsidence will vary. Furthermore, not all
mining systems can be used under all geological conditions; therefore, a uni-
form solution adaptable to all conditions cannot be prescribed. Con-
sequently, the solution for preventing subsidence in an active mine is left to
the individual mine owner/operator with administrative supervision. The Of-
fice of Surface Mining arrived at these general conclusions in adopting regu-
lations to implement the subsidence control provisions of the federal Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,384 stating that viable subsi-
dence prevention methods exist for active mine operations. 385 Government
and industry officials are reported to believe that, when possible, optimum
subsidence damage prevention is achieved through total extraction mining,
which allows mine roof collapse and subsequent surface development: 386
"Longwall mining achieves the highest extraction rate with essentially con-
current overburden collapse." 38 7 Obviously, however, this approach is suit-
able only below undeveloped areas. Thus, each mining technique has its
own limitations. 388
381. For a discussion of surface reconnaissance, geological information, mine maps, core bor-
ings, air rotary borings, borehold photography, sonar calipers, and surface survey information,
see GENERAL ANALYTICS, supra note 378, at 1-3 and 1-6. For an extensive description of how
photography was used in one case to map an underground void, see Mansur & Skouby, Mine
Grouting to Control Building Settlement, 96 J. SOIL MECHANICS AND FOUNDATION DIVISION
511 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Mine Grouting].
382. For a discussion of all of the relevant factors, including angle of draw, critical width-
depth ratio, seam thickness, depth, vertical and horizontal displacements and strains, see GEN-
ERAL ANALYTICS, supra note 378, at 11-16 to 11-37.
383. Id. at 1-3 to 1-13.
384. See text accompanying notes 355-57 supra.
385. See 44 Fed. Reg. 15, 075-76 (1979).
386. COMPTROLLER GENERAL ALTERNATIVES, supra note 300, at 26.
387. Id. For some time longwall mining has been the principal method use in European coal
mines, but, as reported in a 1975 study, it accounts for less than five percent of U.S. production
from underground mines. Ths same study noted, however, that this mining method was increas-
ing in popularity because of its more continuous nature and greater percentage of recovery, and
because improvements in techniques are increasing its efficiency. REPORT TO NATIONAL
SCIENCE FOUNDATION, supra note 335, at 33-39.
388. For general descriptions of longwall mining and room and pillar mining, the two princi-
pal general methods of underground mining, see notes 335-36 supra. For a discussion of the
various subsidence control technologies associated with active mines, such as single face advance
harmonious extraction, partial extraction, panel and pillar, and backfilling, see GENERAL
ANALYTICS, supra note 378, at 11-46 to 11-68.
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The techniques for preventing subsidence from abandoned mine voids
generally involve placing material in the void, either to provide added sup-
port or to eliminate the void. 39 While several techniques exist in each
category, 390 it is difficult to draw a positive conclusion regarding the availa-
bility of adequate technology for preventing subsidence from all abandoned
mines because the problem has not been thoroughly examined. 391 Perhaps
if the technique most appropriate for a given area is selected, the technology
will be available to deal with all the conditions; however, this cannot be
demonstrated at this time. Still, it can be argued that we should not wait for
absolute scientific proof, and that where there is a chance technology will
work, it is better to do something than to do nothing. If there is a possible
benefit, no probable harm, and the costs are minimal, why not go ahead and
do it.
2. Costs
Assuming that no harm can occur as a result of using a particular preven-
tion technique, 392 the argument for doing something leads to the question of
costs. In enacting the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, Congress noted that the cost solely for controlling subsidence under
the 200 urbanized areas already affected by underground mining would be
approximately $1 billion.393 In assessing the costs of the various stabiliza-
tion techniques for abandoned underground mines, a 1975 review concluded
that the cost of stabilizing the surface lands may even exceed the value of
389. Id. at 1-14 & 1-24.
390. For providing added support, a recent survey reviews (1) erecting grout columns, (2)
constructing piers, (3) installing deep foundations, and (4) installing grout-case, and for filling
voids, it reviews (1) controlled hydraulic flushing or backfilling, (2) blind hydraulic flushing or
backfilling, (3) pneumatic filling, (4) fly ash injection, (5) grouting, (6) over-excavation and
backfilling, and (7) blasting. GENERAL ANALYTICS, supra note 378, at 1-15 to 1-23, 1-57 to 1-63.
For a discussion of fly ash injection, see Magnuson & Malenka, Utilization of Fly Ash for
Remote Filling of Mine Voids, U.S. BUREAU OF MINES INFORMATION CIRCULAR 8488-93 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Fly Ash]. For a brief description of controlled flushing, blind flushing, and
pumped-slurry injection, see R. WHAITE & A. ALLEN, Pumped-Slurry Backfilling of Inaccessi-
ble Mine Workings for Subsidence Control, U.S. BUREAU OF MINES INFORMATION CIRCULAR
8667 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Pumped-Slurry Backfilling].
391. GENERAL ANALYTICS, supra note 378, at 1-57. A recent report evaluating a pumped-
slurry backfilling process used at Rock Springs, Wyoming, concluded: "The process was consi-
dered to hold sufficient promise to justif, further experimentation." Pumped-Slurry Backfilling,
supra note 390, at 15. In connection with the use of a similar process at Green Ridge, Pennsyl-
vania, the same report concluded: "The method proved successful under the conditions of the
demonstration .... Further use . . . in different areas will define the range of conditions under
which it is feasible." Id. at 73 -74. See also note 255 supra.
392. A recent study on returning mine wastes to underground mines notes two potential
hazards that must be dealt with: (1) health and safety of mine personnel and (2) ground water
pollution. REPORT To NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, supra note 335, at 2-3.
393. H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 658. A recent project in Green Ridge, Pennsylvania alone cost
$2,165,915. Pumped-Slurry Backfilling, supra note 390, at 75.
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those lands. 394 Other studies confirm the general high expense of stabiliza-
tion methods, but express some optimism that improvements in the use of
the technology and expanded re-use of equipment would reduce costs con-
siderably. 39 This belief in future cost reduction will not, however, justify
an immediate across the board requirement for preventing all future subsi-
dence from abandoned mines. It cannot be concluded that using preventive
measures in active mines only involves minimal costs. Controlled subsidence
methods, such as long-wall mining, are expensive and are not feasible for all
mining operations. 3 96 Furthermore, other preventive measures require
safeguards to mitigate other risks, such as injury to employees, that will
increase their costs. 397 For the foreseeable future, benefit versus risk must
be assessed on a case-by-case basis, but the public, rather than the owner/
operator, should make these decisions. 398
To the extent that this benefit/risk assessment results in some subsidence
prevention efforts being undertaken, the next question is who should bear
the costs of prevention. Essentially, there are three parties who can bear
these costs: coal owners/operators, surface owners, and the public. The via-
bility of coal owners/operators bearing the cost depends to some extent on
whether the mine is active or abandoned. It may not be possible to have an
owner/operator of an abandoned mine bear the cost because such a person
or entity may no longer be in existence 39 9 or it might not be constitutionally
permissible. 400 The only feasible method may be the approach used in the
federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, which imposes
a fee on each future unit of mined coal and uses the receipts to establish a
fund for a variety of reclamation purposes, including subsidence control.4 0 '
When dealing with active mines, it is more practical to impose the costs on
the mine owners/operators, at least initially. The question remains, however,
to what extent the owners/operators will in fact bear the costs or to what
extent the costs will be passed on to the coal consumers. To the extent that
miner's costs are passed on to their consumers, who are electric utilities, the
utilities in turn may pass the costs on to the users of electrical energy. This
would result in higher prices for the goods and services produced by the
394. GENERAL ANALYTICS, supra note 381, at 1-57. COMPTROLLER GENERAL ALTERNA-
TIVES, supra note 300, at 35, identifies a cost of $22,000 per acre. It has been stated, however,
that fly ash can be injected economically. Fly Ash, supra note 390, at 96.
395. Pumped-Slurry Backfilling, supra note 390, at 75.
396. COMPTROLLER GENERAL ALTERNATIVES, supra note 300, at 27.
397. See note 392 supra.
398. See text accompanying notes 415-17 infra.
399. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
400. See Anderson & Anderson Contractors, Inc. v. Latimer, [1979] 13 ENVIR. REP. DEC.
(BNA) 1697 (W., Va. 1979) (the court discusses the effect of retroactively changing reclamation
standards on permittees).




users of that energy and the need for the public to subsidize certain home
owners and apartment tenants who cannot absorb that added expense.
Surface owners and the public-at least to the extent that the public is
the surface owner in subsidence areas such as where schools and roads are
located 40 2 and to the extent that the tax base of the subsided property is less
than that of the property in an unsubsided condition 4 03 -have borne much
of the cost of subsidence from abandoned mines. If they are to continue to
bear the cost of the damage, it may be desirable for them to undertake the
cost of preventing subsidence in some instances. The key however, is, that
the decision in each situation should be made by those directly affected.
Thus, a school district which discovers that one of its schools overlies an
abandoned mine should have the opportunity to undertake a subsidence
prevention project 40 4 or, if an active mine lies underneath the school and it
cannot constitutionally prevent mining from occurring, the school district
should have an opportunity to purchase adequate suport from the mineral
owner. 405
3. Legal Requirements
Pursuant to the provisions of the 1979 Illinois Surface Coal Mining Land
Conservation and Reclamaction Act, 40 6 which implement the requirements
of the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 407 steps
will be taken in active mines to prevent subsidence. However, neither the
federal law nor the federal regulations promulgated thereunder prescribe the
specific methods that must be employed. In view of the variability of geolog-
ical conditions, subsidence control methods and costs, it was not appropriate
at this time for the law to specify prescribed methods of operation for subsi-
dence prevention. 408 Technology suggests that some areas will not subside
largely because of the depth of the excavations; therefore, it should not be
necessary to require prevention methods to be used across the board. 40 9
Furthermore, benefit versus cost analysis should allow other areas to be
excluded from mandatory use of prevention methods. 410
It is not clear whether the "structures or renewable resource lands" stan-
dard adopted pursuant to federal regulation is appropriate for determining
402. See note 4 supra.
403. Cf. Appeals of Mathies Coal Co., 435 Pa. 129, 255 A.2d 906 (1969) involving the valua-
tion for tax purposes of coal left in the ground to support the surface.
404. In a project undertaken in Belleville, Illinois, a building began to settle and crack dur-
ing construction after it was 70% completed and a mine void was discovered below. Mine
Grouting, supra note 381, at 511.
405. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1406.15 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
406. P.A. 81.1015, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2625 (West).
407. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. I 1977).
408. See text accompanying notes 381, 389, 390 & 394 supra.
409. See text accompanying note 382 supra.
410. See text accompanying notes 393-405 supra.
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when subsidence control plans should be required. 411 At a minimum, the
logical future development of established communities should be considered
because the extension of existing communities into previously mined areas
has resulted in much damage from subsidence.412 Unfortunately, the Il-
linois Act appears to give no independent authority to the Illinois Depart-
mient of Mines and Minerals because a purpose of the Act is "to establish
requirements that are no more stringent than those required to meet" the
federal act. 413 Because it is not clear what will happen if the federal Act is
repealed, the Illinois Act should be amended to at least give independent
regulatory authority to the department in such an event.
A straightforward legislative prohibition against causing subsidence from
active mining operations, however, will not necessarily put an end to subsi-
dence. Despite a Pennsylvania law prohibiting subsidence from active
mines, 414 on the books since 1966, a recent report of the Comptroller Gen-
eral notes that substantial subsidence still occurs in Pennsylvania, resulting
in the recovery of damages for failure to meet the statutory duty. 4 15
Perhaps coal operators are paying subsidence claims as a cost of doing busi-
ness, rather than use more expensive subsidence prevention technology.
While such an approach may be sufficient to protect the interests of indi-
vidual surface owners, it does not protect the public interest in the integrity
of the surface. 416 Therefore, legislative proscriptions of subsidence need to
include full regulatory authority, including inspection powers, and such sanc-
tions as injunctive relief and civil and criminal penalties in order to see that
subsidence prevention technology is employed. Even then, success cannot
be expected unless the enforcing agency actually performs its duties.
Because the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
specifies that abandoned mine reclamation funds can be used for mine sub-
sidence prevention,4 17 and because the 1979 Illinois Abandoned Mined
411. See text discussion at notes 343-50 supra.
412. See text discussion at note 5 supra.
413. P.A. 81-1015, § 1.02(c), 1979 Il1. Legis. Serv. 2626 (West).
414. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
415. It has been reported that 264 Pennsylvania property owners were paid $1.1 million in
damages between 1966 and 1977. COMPTROLLER GENERAL ALTERNATIVES, supra note 300, at
12.
416. See text accompanying notes 364-67 supra. The Comptroller General's recent report
identifies Illinois and Pennsylvania as the two states with the most widespread subsidence prob-
lems. COMPTROLLER GENERAL ALTERNATIVES, supra note 300, at 8-15. Nationally, "in excess
of $1 billion" in structural damage is projected to occur in the period 1973 to 2000, with about
$30 million annual subsidence damage to structures, including $10.8 million annually to school
buildings and $2.7 million annually to roads, utilities, and services. Id. at 6-7. In addition to
structural losses, farmland loss could include livestock killed, usable grazing land or cropland,
alteration of drainage patterns and damage to water supplies. Furthermore, where structures
are involved there are dislocation losses. Land value is depreciated, and there can be impact on
economic growth if a community does not have an area into which it can safely expand. Id. at 7.
417. See text accompanying note 244 supra.
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Lands and Waters Reclamtion Act does not so specify, 418 the regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Illinois Act should clarify this issue. It also
should be noted that any prevention project must fit within the priorities
established by Congress, as reflected in the Illinois Act and accompanying
regulations. 419 In view of the costs of subsidence prevention projects, 42 °
the many reclamation problems that exist as a result of abandoned mine
lands, 421 and the limited funds available, 422 this is a proper approach. How-
ever, as the more serious and more cost-efficient reclamation problems are
solved and funds still remain available, subsidence prevention projects may
well be undertaken. The abandoned mine reclamation fund program is in-
tended to be a long range program. Therefore, comprehensive planning for
the future should begin now and one element of these plans must be subsi-
dence prevention from abandoned mine lands.
Preventing Harm
Because it is possible that not all subsidence can be prevented and it
certainly is true that not all subsidence will be prevented, it is necessary to
consider measures for preventing harm when subsidence occurs. The four
techniques for preventing harm from occurring when subsidence takes place
are: (1) constructing buildings that will be resistant to subsidence damage; 423
(2) shoring up or reinforcing existing buildings prior to subsidence damage
occurring or to prevent further subsidence damage;4 2 4 (3) limiting, through
land use planning controls, the placing of structures above undermined areas
prone to subsidence or areas due to be undermined; 4 25 and (4) relocation of
surface moveables. 426 These techniques would be particularly important
where planned subsidence is intended and the mine owner/operator does
not own the surface. All four techniques essentially relate to preventing
harm to structures, and, although methods (1) and (2) indirectly relate to
418. See text accompanying notes 213-15 supra.
419. See text accompanying notes 231-40 supra.
420. See notes 396-97 supra.
421. See H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-60, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 596-99.
422. As of September 30, 1978, there was available in the fund for Illinois only $3,328,218.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR UNDER THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL
AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977, 43 (1978). One Pennsylvania subsidence prevention project
alone cost $2,165,915. pumped-slurry backfilling, supra note 390, at 75.
423. This technique currently is required for buildings in many earthquake and floodplain
zones. Measures may include use of concrete slabs, independent building units with releveling
jacks and gap provisions, and small box form houses. COMPTROLLER GENERAL ALTERNATIVES,
supra note 300, at 34-35.
424. Measures may include trenching and filling with compression material, cutting buildings
and walls to relieve tension, taping large windows, using arch supports and wall shoring, and
reinforcing or jacking. Id.
425. Measures may include zoning and subdivision regulations, public improvements, and tax
incentives. Id. at 34.
426. 30 C.F.R. § 784.20(b)(iii), (iv) (1979).
19801
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
maintaining the integrity of the surface in that the surface will be usable for
such buildings, all of them assume subsidence will occur.
Questions arise, however, as to who will pay for the added construction
costs incurred to prevent damage and who will pay for the costs of reinforc-
ing or moving existing structures. Perhaps requiring new construction stan-
dards would be the most difficult approach in assessing some of the costs to
the mine owner/operator. Under the present federal scheme, it is clear that
abandoned mine reclamation funds can be used for shoring up existing build-
ings, at least in emergency situations. 427 Because Illinois regulations relat-
ing to the expenditure of abandoned mine reclamation funds have not yet
been promulgated, the opportunity exists to specifically address this issue. If
measures to prevent harm are to be undertaken in areas of abandoned un-
derground mines, these areas must be identified 42 and a determination
must be made about the likelihood of subsidence occurring in that area. Both
private and public funds would be wasted if monies were expended for rein-
forcements where none were needed. Similarly, it would be nonproductive
to enact subsidence-related land use controls for areas where subsidence is
unlikely to occur. The federal regulations leave measures to prevent harm
from active mines to be developed in the mine operator's subsidence control
plan. 429 This approach should place the financial responsibility for such
measures on the coal owner/operator, depending on how rigorously the reg-
ulatory authority evaluates subsidence control plans. Such financial responsi-
bility is important because abandoned mine reclamation funds cannot be
used to prevent subsidence from active mines. 430
Because these measures for preventing harm from subsidence serve the
secondary public purpose of preventing widespread economic losses and dis-
location, they are legitimate regulatory tools and the Illinois regulations will
need to provide for their implementation. It should be clear, however, that
because these measures do not relate directly to the primary public purpose
of maintaining the integrity of the surface, they must receive a role secon-
dary to preventing subsidence.
Relief from Harm
Because subsidence from previously mined land and from active mines
will continue to occur in the foreseeable future, and because measures to
prevent harm when subsidence occurs will not be fully effective, it is neces-
sary to consider the relief that is and should be available to the surface
owner or tenant who suffers harm. The question can be viewed in the larger
sense of who will bear the costs of that harm as among the taxpayers, coal
427. This apparently includes reimbursing build*ing owners who expend funds for such mea-
sures in the emergency situation. U.S. to Reimburse Energy Family $1,500 Spent on Mine Sink
Damage, SOUTHERN ILLINOISAN, Aug. 23, 1979, at 3, col. 1. See note 245 supra.
428. See text accompanying notes 3, 68-70 supra.
429. 30 C.F.R. § 784.20(b)(3) (1979).
430. See note 212 supra.
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owners/operators, and surface owners/tenants. In addition to leaving the en-
tire burden on the surface owner, three different approaches can be consid-
ered: reimbursing the person harmed for his or her damages; requiring the
wrongdoer to reclaim or rehabilitate the land or structures; and providing
low cost loans to the person harmed.
The person harmed can be reimbursed for damages by coal mine owner/
operators, the government, or private insurance. Because Illinois common
law places an absolute duty on the owner of the mineral estate to provide
subjacent support for the surface in its natural state, 43 1 it would seem that
persons suffering harm should obtain relief from the coal mine owner/
operator. Two primary problems have developed, however, in enforcing this
duty. First, the Illinois courts have held that the surface owner can waive
the right to recover for breach of this duty, and the waiver is binding on
subsequent surface owners if it is so intended by the parties to the initial
waiver. 432 In effect then, the duty itself can be waived permanently. This
approach assumes that the duty is owed only to the surface owner and not to
the surface itself or to the public. Considering that sixty-five percent of Il-
linois is underlaid with coal, 433 surface owners above this coal could con-
ceivably waive the duty of surface support and thereby subject the people of
Illinois to an intolerable future. Second, subsidence usually occurs long after
mining and, therefore, even if liability has not been waived, it is unlikely
that there now exists a defendant from whom damages can be recovered.
These two problems have been aggravated by judicial opinions declining to
hold successors-in-interest to coal deposits responsible for the conduct of
prior owners. 43 4
In view of these two general problems with the Illinois common law
and the heightened public interest in subsidence problems, the Il-
linois legislative efforts have been directed toward making insurance availa-
ble to surface owners. As the insurance program is rather new, it will be
some time before its adequacy can be judged. A recent report noted, how-
ever, that in Pennsylvania, where subsidence insurance has been available
since 1961, only about three percent of the eligible homeowners carry insur-
ance. 435 Although past and present studies have helped locate many aban-
doned underground mines, 43 6 the General Assembly needs to allow this in-
formation to be widely disseminated to provide for any future efforts neces-
sary to obtain the most comprehensive data possible on abandoned under-
ground mines. The legislature should not rely on insurance companies to
develop this information in their efforts to convince surface owners to purch-
ase subsidence insurance. A surface owner should be able to go to the
431. See text accompanying notes 10-34 supra.
432. See text accompanying notes 108-22 supra.
433. ILLINOIS COAL ASS'N, ILLINOIS COAL FACTS 2 (1979); Gluskoter, Illinois Coal: Charac-
ter and Quality, ILLINOIS COAL: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL ILLINOIS ENERGY
CONFERENCE 64 (1976).
434. See text accompanying notes 55-82 supra.
435. COMPTROLLER GENERAL ALTERNATIVES, supra note 300, at 12.
436. See note 3 supra.
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county courthouse and, with a minimum of effort, determine whether there
is a past or present underground mine beneath the surface or in a reasonable
proximity. 437 In addition, the legislature should consider the Pennsylvania
law requiring surface grantors to explicitly notify their grantees as to
whether the surface has protection against subsidence. 438 If owners know
that they do not have recourse against the mine they may be persuaded to
acquire insurance.
Although the provisions of the 1979 Illinois Surface Coal Mining Land
Conservation and Reclamation Act and the federal Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 impose a duty on the mine operator to prevent
subsidence, and a breach of that duty may result in damages owed to those
who suffer harm, the duty exists only where it is technologically and
economically feasible to prevent subsidence.439 Because of this lack of
comprehensiveness, the Illinois General Assembly should declare that future
waiver clauses are contrary to public policy and should impose upon future
purchases of coal liability for subsidence resulting from mining operations
conducted by previous owners of that coal. In the alternative, the legislature
could enact a law similar to the 1966 Pennsylvania Act that prohibits subsi-
dence from active mines beneath structures and states that failure to meet
this statutory duty will result in damages owed to those who consequently
suffer harm. 440 A bonding requirement would help assure that adequate
funds are available for such damage payments.
While the federal regulations contain provisions for surface owner pro-
tection, 4 4 ' they provide for, but do not require, rehabilitation as an option.
Thus, a mine operator can discharge its duty to the surface owner through
the purchase of an insurance policy. 442 Because rehabilitation is consistent
with the primary public interest of maintaining the integrity of the surface, it
may be necessary to give more detailed consideration to the feasibility of
requiring rehabilitation in given situations.
Finally, Illinois law does not provide for low cost loans to assist those
suffering damage. At a minimum, therefore, the Illinois General Assembly
should consider a provision similar to the Pennsylavania law, which allows
special funds to be used to temporarily relocate people whose homes are
destroyed and to aid these people in effecting repairs.443
437. Perhaps mapping and notice provisions under the federal Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 will prove sufficient as far as active mines are concerned. In part this
will depend on the permanency and future availability of those maps and notices. See 44 Fed.
Reg. 15, 440 (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 817.122).
438. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1406.14 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
439. See text accompanying note 334 supra.
440. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
441. 30 C.F.R. § 817.124 (1979).
442. Id. § 8 17.124(c).
443. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3241 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
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CONCLUSION
In 1880, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wilms, established an absolute
right to subjacent support in the surface owner, a right inherent in the bun-
dle of rights called ownership and, therefore, entitled to substantial protec-
tion in the courts. A period of strict enforcement of this right followed. Be-
ginning with decisions in 1923 relating to waiver of the right and followed by
decisions in 1963 relating to the liability of successors-in-interest to coal or coal
mines, the Illinois courts began to deviate from the substantial-protection
standard. This can be attributed at least in part to the failure of the courts to
consider the public interest in the integrity of the surface. Recent legislation
at the state and federal levels of government have addressed the public con-
cern over subsidence. Programs established under this legislation will do
much to give protection to those who were left without recourse as a result
of the court decisions. In addition, if faithfully implemented, the legislative
mandates will help return Illinois to a strict enforcement of the basic right
first enunciated in Wilms.

